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US adds to counter-terror sanctions, and makes some Iran and Syria updates

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Today, OFAC added the following persons:

AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad (a.k.a. AL GAMAL, Saeed Ahmed Mohammed; a.k.a. RAMI, Abu-Ahmad; a.k.a. "ABU-'ALI"; a.k.a. "AHMAD, Abu"; a.k.a. "HISHAM"), Iran; DOB 01 Jan 1979; nationality Yemen; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport 04716186 (Yemen) (individual) [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)-QODS FORCE). 

AL-RAWI, Talib 'Ali Husayn Al-Ahmad (a.k.a. AL-AHMAD, Talib (Arabic: طالب الاحمد)), Istanbul, Turkey; DOB 23 Dec 1973; POB Al Bukamal, Syria; nationality Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

AS'AD, Hani 'Abd-al-Majid Muhammad (Arabic: هاني عبدالمجيد محمد اسعد) (a.k.a. AL-'ABSI, Hani; a.k.a. ASAD, Hani Abdulmajeed Mohammed), Turkey; DOB 16 Apr 1977; POB Yemen; nationality Yemen; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

MAHAMUD, Abdi Nasir Ali (Arabic: عبدي ناصر علي محمود) (a.k.a. MAHMOUD, Abdi Naser; a.k.a. MAHMUD, Abdi Nasir Ali; a.k.a. MUHAMMAD, 'Abd-al-Nasir 'Ali), United Arab Emirates; Istanbul, Turkey; DOB 01 May 1977; nationality United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport 548347810 (United Kingdom) expires 20 Jan 2029 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

MALLAH, Abdul Jalil (a.k.a. AL-MALAHI, 'Abd-al-Jalil; a.k.a. AL-MALLAH, 'Abd-al-Jalil), Greece; Malmo, Sweden; DOB 05 Jan 1975; nationality Syria; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Identification Number 750105-3735 (Sweden) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

MUHAMMAD, Jami' 'Ali (a.k.a. MOHAMMED, Jama Ali), Oman; DOB 01 Jan 1980; nationality Somalia; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport 60358533 (Oman) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

SABHARWAL, Manoj, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 01 Dec 1960; POB Durg, India; nationality India; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport Z3795762 (India) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

entities:

ADOON GENERAL TRADING FZE (Arabic: ادون جنرال تريدنج م.م.ح), Centurion Star Tower, B-Block, Office 506, Port Saeed, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Office No. 506, B Floor, Centurion Star Tower, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; B1 Block, Flat 623, PO Box 21158, Ajman, United Arab Emirates; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] (Linked To: MAHAMUD, Abdi Nasir Ali). 

ADOON GENERAL TRADING GIDA SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI, EGS Bloklari, No: 12-340 Yesilkoy Mahallesi, Ataturk Caddesi, Bakirkoy, Istanbul 34149, Turkey; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Chamber of Commerce Number 1154982 (Turkey); Registration Number 165136-5 (Turkey); Central Registration System Number 8143922500001 (Turkey) [SDGT] (Linked To: MAHAMUD, Abdi Nasir Ali).

ADOON GENERAL TRADING L.L.C. (Arabic: ادون التجارة العامة ش.ذ.م.م), Office Number 506, B Block, Centurion Star Tower, Opp. Deira City Center, Port Saeed, P.O. Box 64827, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Al Ras Area, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Website www.adoongroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Business Registration Number 682443 (United Arab Emirates); alt. Business Registration Number 10889604 (United Arab Emirates) [SDGT] (Linked To: MAHAMUD, Abdi Nasir Ali).

SWAID AND SONS FOR EXCHANGE CO. (Arabic: شركة سويد و اولاده الصرافة) (a.k.a. SUWAYD AND SONS MONEY EXCHANGE), Al-Zubairi Street, Swaid's Building, Sanaa, Sana'a City, Yemen; Swaid Building, Al Zubeiry Street, in front of IBY, Sanaa 8000600, Yemen; Website https://swaidexchange.com; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Organization Type: Other monetary intermediation [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad).

and vessel:

TRIPLE SUCCESS (TRA025) Products Tanker Gabon flag; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9167148 (vessel) [SDGT] (Linked To: AL-JAMAL, Sa'id Ahmad Muhammad). 

to its counter-terrorism sanctions program. Additionally, the following designations:

GHALEBANI, Ahmad (a.k.a. GHALEHBANI, Ahmad; a.k.a. QALEHBANI, Ahmad); DOB 01 Jan 1953 to 31 Dec 1954; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport H20676140 (Iran); Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN]. 

GHALEHBANI, Ahmad (a.k.a. GHALEBANI, Ahmad; a.k.a. QALEHBANI, Ahmad); DOB 01 Jan 1953 to 31 Dec 1954; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport H20676140 (Iran); Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

QALEHBANI, Ahmad (a.k.a. GHALEBANI, Ahmad; a.k.a. GHALEHBANI, Ahmad); DOB 01 Jan 1953 to 31 Dec 1954; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport H20676140 (Iran); Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company; Director, Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

BAZARGAN, Farzad; DOB 03 Jun 1956; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport D14855558 (Iran); alt. Passport Y21130717 (Iran); Managing Director, Hong Kong Intertrade Company (individual) [IRAN].

MOINIE, Mohammad; DOB 04 Jan 1956; POB Brojerd, Iran; citizen United Kingdom; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport 301762718 (United Kingdom); Commercial Director, Naftiran Intertrade Company Sarl (individual) [IRAN].

ASM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC (a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING COMPANY; a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LLC), Jumeirah Lake Tower, Cluster 1, Platinum Tower, Office 2405, P.O. Box 36102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Samer).

ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING COMPANY (a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LLC; a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC), Jumeirah Lake Tower, Cluster 1, Platinum Tower, Office 2405, P.O. Box 36102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Samer).

ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LLC (a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING COMPANY; a.k.a. ASM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC), Jumeirah Lake Tower, Cluster 1, Platinum Tower, Office 2405, P.O. Box 36102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Samer).

SILVER PINE (a.k.a. SILVER PINE DMCC), Jumeirah Lake Tower, Cluster 1, Platinum Tower, Office 2405, P.O. Box 36102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Husen).

SILVER PINE DMCC (a.k.a. SILVER PINE), Jumeirah Lake Tower, Cluster 1, Platinum Tower, Office 2405, P.O. Box 36102, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Husen).

SEA CHARMING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. SEA CHARMING SHIPPING CO LTD), Office A, 3/F., Eton Building, 288, Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong, Hong Kong; Executive Order 13846 information: LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(i); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON. Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); C.R. No. F0019588 (Hong Kong); Identification Number IMO 6106782; Company Number 58462 (Marshall Islands) [IRAN-EO13846].

SEA CHARMING SHIPPING CO LTD (a.k.a. SEA CHARMING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED), Office A, 3/F., Eton Building, 288, Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong, Hong Kong; Executive Order 13846 information: LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(i); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON. Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); C.R. No. F0019588 (Hong Kong); Identification Number IMO 6106782; Company Number 58462 (Marshall Islands) [IRAN-EO13846].

AOXING SHIP MANAGEMENT SHANGHAI LTD (a.k.a. AOXING SHIP MGMT SHANGHAI LTD; a.k.a. SHANGHAI AOXING INTERNATIONAL SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 上海傲兴国际船舶管理有限公司)), Unit 6, 17F., Jinmao Tower, No. 88 Shiji Ave, China Pilot Free-Trade Zone, Shanghai, China (Chinese Simplified: ⾦茂大厦17层06单元, 世纪大道88号, 中国⾃由贸易试验区, 上海, China); 17th Floor, Jinmao Tower, 88, Shiji Dadao, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai 200121, China; Executive Order 13846 information: LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(i); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON. Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Identification Number IMO 5066956; United Social Credit Code Certificate (USCCC) 913101157492555155 (China) [IRAN-EO13846].

SHANGHAI AOXING INTERNATIONAL SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 上海傲兴国际船舶管理有限公司) (a.k.a. AOXING SHIP MANAGEMENT SHANGHAI LTD; a.k.a. AOXING SHIP MGMT SHANGHAI LTD), Unit 6, 17F., Jinmao Tower, No. 88 Shiji Ave, China Pilot Free-Trade Zone, Shanghai, China (Chinese Simplified: ⾦茂大厦17层06单元, 世纪大道88号, 中国⾃由贸易试验区, 上海, China); 17th Floor, Jinmao Tower, 88, Shiji Dadao, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai 200121, China; Executive Order 13846 information: LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(i); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON. Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Identification Number IMO 5066956; United Social Credit Code Certificate (USCCC) 913101157492555155 (China) [IRAN-EO13846].

AOXING SHIP MGMT SHANGHAI LTD (a.k.a. AOXING SHIP MANAGEMENT SHANGHAI LTD; a.k.a. SHANGHAI AOXING INTERNATIONAL SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD. (Chinese Simplified: 上海傲兴国际船舶管理有限公司)), Unit 6, 17F., Jinmao Tower, No. 88 Shiji Ave, China Pilot Free-Trade Zone, Shanghai, China (Chinese Simplified: ⾦茂大厦17层06单元, 世纪大道88号, 中国⾃由贸易试验区, 上海, China); 17th Floor, Jinmao Tower, 88, Shiji Dadao, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai 200121, China; Executive Order 13846 information: LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(i); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Sec. 5(a)(ii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BANKING TRANSACTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(iii); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BLOCKING PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY. Sec. 5(a)(iv); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON. Sec. 5(a)(v); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: IMPORT SANCTIONS. Sec. 5(a)(vi); alt. Executive Order 13846 information: SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. Sec. 5(a)(vii); Identification Number IMO 5066956; United Social Credit Code Certificate (USCCC) 913101157492555155 (China) [IRAN-EO13846].

have been removed from the Iran and/or Syria sanctions programs. Lastly, the following existing Syria sanctions listings were updated:

FOZ, Amer (a.k.a. FOZ, Amer Zuhair); DOB 11 Mar 1976; POB Homs, Syria; Gender Male; Passport O6O1O274747 (Syria) (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: ASM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC). -to- FOZ, Amer (a.k.a. FOZ, Amer Zuhair (Arabic: عامر زهیر فوز); a.k.a. FOZ, Amer Zuheir), Yenisehir Mahallesi Ataturk Bulvari Yalim Apt. 61/1-A, Iskenderun Hatay, Turkey; United Arab Emirates; DOB 11 Mar 1976; POB Homs, Syria; citizen Turkey; Gender Male; Passport O6O1O274747 (Syria); alt. Passport U10511291 (Turkey); alt. Passport RE0027453 (Syria); National ID No. 69736232604 (Turkey); alt. National ID No. 162280535 (United Arab Emirates) (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Samer). 

FOZ, Husen (a.k.a. FOZ, Hasan; a.k.a. FOZ, Hosn Zuhair; a.k.a. FOZ, Hoson; a.k.a. FOZ, Housen; a.k.a. FOZ, Hussen), Meadows 1, Street 13, Villa 38, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Adawai Area Rawdet Aleman Bld, 1st Floor, Damascus City, Syria; DOB 25 May 1981; POB Lattakia, Syria; nationality Syria; alt. nationality Saint Kitts and Nevis; citizen Turkey; alt. citizen Syria; Gender Female; Passport U08527769 (Turkey); alt. Passport RE0027450 (Syria); National ID No. 06010274768 (Syria) (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: ASM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC). -to- FOZ, Husen (a.k.a. FOZ, Hasan; a.k.a. FOZ, Hosn Zuhair; a.k.a. FOZ, Hoson; a.k.a. FOZ, Housen; a.k.a. FOZ, Husen Aljibawi; a.k.a. FOZ, Hussen (Arabic: حسن فوز)), Meadows 1, Street 13, Villa 38, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Adawai Area Rawdet Aleman Bld, 1st Floor, Damascus City, Syria; Yenisehir Mahallesi Ataturk Bulvari Yalim, Apt 61/1-A, Iskenderun Hatay, Turkey; DOB 25 May 1981; POB Lattakia, Syria; nationality Syria; alt. nationality Saint Kitts and Nevis; citizen Turkey; alt. citizen Syria; Gender Female; Passport U08527769 (Turkey); alt. Passport RE0027450 (Syria); National ID No. 06010274768 (Syria); alt. National ID No. 784198164202982 (United Arab Emirates); alt. National ID No. 69727232996 (Turkey) (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: FOZ, Samer).

And press releases about the new designations were issued by the State Department:

U.S. Sanctions International Network Enriching Houthis in Yemen

Today, the United States is designating Sa’id Ahmad Muhammad al-Jamal and other individuals and entities involved in an international network he has used to provide tens of millions of dollars’ worth of funds to the Houthis in cooperation with senior officials in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF).  Those in al-Jamal’s network of front companies and intermediaries sell commodities, such as Iranian petroleum, throughout the Middle East and beyond and channel a significant portion of the revenue to the Houthis in Yemen.  We are designating al-Jamal pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.  

The 11 other individuals, companies, and vessel sanctioned today play key roles in this illicit network, including Hani ‘Abd-al-Majid Muhammad As’ad, a Yemeni accountant who has facilitated financial transfers to the Houthis, and Jami’ ‘Ali Muhammad, a Houthi and IRGC-QF associate who helped al-Jamal procure vessels, facilitate shipments of fuel, and transfer funds for the benefit of the Houthis.  These 11 individuals, entities, and vessel are being sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13224 for their relationships with al-Jamal and other parts of this network.  

The United States is working to help resolve the conflict in Yemen and bring lasting humanitarian relief to the Yemeni people.  The Houthis’ ongoing offensive on Marib runs directly counter to those goals, posing a threat to the already dire humanitarian situation in Yemen and potentially triggering increased fighting throughout Yemen.  

It is time for the Houthis to accept a ceasefire and for all parties to resume political talks.  Only a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire can bring the urgent relief needed by Yemenis, and only a peace agreement can resolve the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.  The United States will continue to apply pressure to the Houthis, including through targeted sanctions, to advance those goals.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State are lifting sanctions on three former Government of Iran officials, and two companies previously involved in the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of Iranian petrochemical products, as a result of a verified change in status or behavior on the part of the sanctioned parties. These actions demonstrate our commitment to lifting sanctions in the event of a change in status or behavior by sanctioned persons.

and the Treasury Department:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Network Financing Houthi Aggression and Instability in Yemen 

June 10, 2021

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating members of a smuggling network that helps fund Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis in Yemen.  Led by Iran-based Houthi financier Sa’id al-Jamal, this network generates tens of millions of dollars in revenue from the sale of commodities, like Iranian petroleum, a significant portion of which is then directed through a complex network of intermediaries and exchange houses in multiple countries to the Houthis in Yemen.

“This network’s financial support enables the Houthis’ deplorable attacks threatening civilian and critical infrastructure in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  These attacks undermine efforts to bring the conflict to an end and, most tragically, starve tens of millions of innocent civilians,” said Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control Andrea M. Gacki.  “Ending the suffering of millions of Yemenis is of paramount concern to the United States, and we will continue to hold accountable those responsible for widespread misery and deny them access to the global financial system.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.  The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in 2007 for support to numerous terrorist groups.

Since the onset of the conflict in Yemen, the Houthis have relied on support from the IRGC-QF to wage their campaign against the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-led Coalition.  Despite growing calls for peace, the Houthis have continued to escalate their lethal attacks inside Yemen and in the region, with dire consequences for Yemeni civilians and Yemen’s neighbors.  The Houthis have used ballistic missiles, explosives, naval mines, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to strike military targets, population centers, infrastructure, and nearby commercial shipping in Saudi Arabia, along key international trade routes.

Today, OFAC and the Department of State are also lifting sanctions on three former Government of Iran officials, and two companies formerly involved in the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of Iranian petrochemical products.  These delistings are a result of a verified change in behavior or status on the part of the sanctioned parties and demonstrate the U.S. government’s commitment to lifting sanctions in the event of a change in behavior or status for sanctioned persons.

SA’ID AL-JAMAL: FINANCIAL CONDUIT TO THE HOUTHIS

Sa’id al-Jamal, an Iran-based Houthi financial supporter, directs a network of front companies and vessels that smuggle Iranian fuel, petroleum products, and other commodities to customers throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.  A significant portion of the revenue generated from these sales is directed through a complex international network of intermediaries and exchange houses to the Houthis in Yemen.  This revenue helps fund the destabilizing regional activities of the Houthis, IRGC-QF, and others, including Hizballah.  Sa’id al-Jamal’s network has generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue through the sale of Iranian commodities to those willing to evade sanctions.  Sa’id al-Jamal also maintains connections to Hizballah and has worked with the group to send millions of dollars to support the Houthis.

Sa’id al-Jamal is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

OFAC is also identifying the Gabon-flagged vessel Triple Success, which has been used by Sa’id al-Jamal to smuggle Iranian petroleum products out of Iran, as property in which Sa’id al-Jamal has an interest.

SA’ID AL-JAMAL’S INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT NETWORK

A cohort of businessmen and shipping experts support Sa’id al-Jamal’s network, enabling the illicit sale of Iranian goods abroad and the repatriation of profits to entities including the Houthis in Yemen, and the IRGC-QF.

Turkey-based Houthi-affiliate Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud, a key business partner of Sa’id al-Jamal, acts as a financial intermediary and has coordinated the smuggling of petrochemicals for the network.  Mahamud has leveraged his position as managing director of UAE-based Adoon General Trading FZE to facilitate the transfer of millions of dollars on behalf of Sa’id al-Jamal.  Mahamud is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal.

Adoon General Trading FZE and two additional companies, UAE-based Adoon General Trading L.L.C. and Turkey-based Adoon General Trading Gida Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Mahamud.

UAE-based Indian national Manoj Sabharwal is a maritime shipping professional who manages shipping operations for Sa’id al-Jamal’s network and advises al-Jamal on smuggling Iranian oil products.  Sabharwal is responsible for coordinating shipments of Iranian petroleum products and commodities throughout the Middle East and Asia while obscuring Sa’id al-Jamal’s involvement.  Sabharwal is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal.

Hani ‘Abd-al-Majid Muhammad As’ad, a Turkey-based Yemeni accountant affiliated with the Houthis, manages Sa’id al-Jamal’s finances and has used multiple bank accounts to send and receive millions of dollars in payments for Sa’id al-Jamal’s shipping operations, as well as to facilitate transfers to the Houthis in Yemen.  As’ad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal.

Since 2017, Jami’ ‘Ali Muhammad, a Somali businessman and Houthi and IRGC-QF associate, has assisted Sa’id al-Jamal’s efforts to procure vessels, facilitate shipments of Iranian fuel, and transfer funds for the benefit of the Houthis.  Jami’ is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal.

At the direction of Sa’id al-Jamal, Turkey-based Syrian national Talib ‘Ali Husayn Al-Ahmad al-Rawi and Greece-based Syrian national Abdul Jalil Mallah have facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars to Swaid and Sons, a Yemen-based exchange house associated with the Houthis.  Sa’id al-Jamal has used Swaid and Sons to send millions of dollars to IRGC-QF officials deployed in Yemen.

Mallah has facilitated the shipment of Iranian crude oil to Syria.  Mallah has worked with Sa’id al-Jamal to send millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil to Hizballah.  Al-Rawi has worked with Sa’id al-Jamal to transfer millions of dollars from Qatirji Group purchases of Iranian petroleum products to Swaid and Sons in Yemen.  Al-Rawi, Mallah, and Swaid and Sons are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of the persons designated are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with the designated persons or their blocked property. In addition, foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for, or persons that provide material or certain other support to, the persons designated today risk exposure to sanctions that could sever their access to the U.S. financial system or block their property or interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases: State, Treasury


SECO amends 28 designated under Syria sanctions, removes 5

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Swiss authorities today amended 25 individual:

SSID: 200-11761 Name: Ihab Makhlouf
Sex: M DOB: 21 Jan 1973 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Ehab (Iehab) Identification document: Passport No. N002848852, Syrian Arab Republic Justification: a) Leading businessman operating in Syria. Vice President of, and shareholder in, Syriatel, the leading mobile telephone operator in Syria. He also has business interests in several other Syrian companies and entities, including Ramak Construction Co and Syrian International Private University for Science and Technology (SIUST). b) As Vice PresidentHe is an influential member of Syriatel, which transfers a significant part of its profitsthe Makhlouf family and closely connected to the Syrian government by wayAssad family; cousin of its licensing contract, IhabPresident Bashar al- Assad. In 2020, Ehab Makhlouf is also directly supportingtook over Rami Makhlouf’s business activities and the Syrian regimegovernment granted him the contracts to operate and manage the duty-free markets across the country. c) He is an influential member of the Makhlouf family and closely connected to the Assad family; cousin of President Bashar al- Assad. Relation: a) Cousin of Bashar Al-Assad (SSID 200-11614) b) Related to Syriatel (SSID 200-12428) Other information: Passport no: N002848852 Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 10 Jun 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-11912 Name: Samir Hassan
Sex: M
Justification: a) Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and/or activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy. He holds interests in and/or has significant influence in the Amir Group and Cham Holding, two conglomerates with interests in the real estate, tourism, transport and finance sectors. From Mar 2014 until Sep 2018, he held the position of Chairman for RussiaPresident of the Bilateral Business Councils following his appointment by Minister of Economy, Khodr OrfaliSyrian-Russian business council. b) Samir Hassan supports the Syrian regime’s war effort with cash donations. c) Samir Hassan is associated with persons benefitting from or supporting the regime. In particular, he is associated with Rami Makhlouf and Issam Anbouba, who have been designated by the Council and benefit from the Syrian regime. Relation: a) CloseRelated to Rami Makhlouf
(SSID 200-11672) b) Related to Issam Anbouba (SSID 200-11924) c) Related to Cham Holding (SSID 200-12406) Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 17 Dec 2014, 19 Jan 2016, 10 Jun 2016, 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-11937 Name: Adnan Hassan Mahmoud
Sex: M DOB: 1966 POB: Tartous, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Former Syrian Ambassador to IranIran until 2020. Former Minister of Information in power after May 2011. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 10 Jun 2016, 16 Jun 2017, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12041 Name: Ali Barakat
Sex: M Title: Major General Good quality a.k.a.: a) Barakat b) Ali
Justification: 103rd Brigade of the Republican Guard Division. Military official involved in the violence in Homs. Promoted to Major GeneralCurrently serves in 2017the 30th Mobile Infantry Division of the Republican Guard. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 13 Aug 2019, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12124 Name: Jamal Yunes
Sex: M Title: Brigadier General Good quality a.k.a.: Younes
Justification: Gave orders to troops to shoot at protestors in Mo’adamiyehMo’adamiyeh. Head of the Military Security Committee in Hama in 2018. Other information: Position: Commander of the 555th Regiment Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12195 Name: Emad Abdul-Ghani Sabouni
Sex: M DOB: 1964 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Imad b) Abdul Ghani c) Al Sabuni
Justification: Former Minister of Telecommunications and Technology, in office until at least Apr 2014. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Appointed in Jul 2016 as the Head of Planning and International Cooperation Agency (government agency).PICC). The PICC is a government agency, affiliated to the Prime Ministry and produces, in particular, the five-year plans that provide the broad guidelines for the Government’s economic and development policies. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 10 Jun 2016, 12 Jun 2018, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12627 Name: Abdul-Salam Fajr Mahmoud
Sex: M Title: Brigadier General DOB: 1959
Justification: Head of the Security Committee of the Southern Region since Dec 2020. Former Head of the Bab Tuma (Damascus) Branch of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service. Former Head of the Mezze Airport Air Force intelligence investigation branch. Responsible for the torture of opponents in custody. Under international arrest warrant for ‘complicity in acts of torture’, ‘complicity in crimes against humanity’ and ‘complicity in war crimes’. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 12 Jun 2018, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12635 Name: Qusay Ibrahim Mihoub
Sex: M Title: Colonel DOB: 1961 POB: Derghamo, Jableh, Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: High-ranking officer at the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service. Former Head of the Deraa branch of the air force'sforce’s intelligence service (sent from Damascus to Deraa at the start of demonstrations there). Responsible for the torture of opponents in custody as well as the violent repression of peaceful protests in the southern region. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12647 Name: Ibrahim Ma’ala
Sex: M Title: Brigadier General Good quality a.k.a.: Maala (Maale, Ma'la)
Justification: Head of Branch 285 (Damascus) of the General Intelligence Directorate (replaced Brigadier General Hussam Fendi at the end of 2011). Responsible for the torture of opponents in custody. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 17 Jun 2015, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12655 Name: Hussam Luqa
Sex: M Title: Major General DOB: 1964 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Husam (Housam, Houssam) b) Louqa (Louca, Louka, Luka) Justification: Former Head of the Security Committee of the Southern Region from 2018 to 2020. Former Head of the General Security Directorate. Major General. From Apr 2012 to 2.12.2018, was head of the Homs branch of the Political Security Directorate (succeeded Brigadier General Nasr al-Ali). Since 3.12.2018, head of the Political Security Directorate. Responsible for the torture of opponents in custody. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12659 Name: Taha Taha
Sex: M Title: Brigadier General
Justification: SiteDeputy assistant to the Head of the Political Security Division. Former site manager of the Latakia branch of the Political Security Directorate. Responsible for the torture of opponents in custody. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12675 Name: Ahmed al-Jarroucheh
Sex: M Title: Major General DOB: 1957 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ahmad b) al-Jarousha (al- Jarousheh, al-Jaroucha, al-Jarouchah, al-Jaroucheh)
Justification: Former head of the foreign branch of General Intelligence (Branch 279). As such, responsible for General Intelligence arrangements in Syrian embassies. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12687 Name: Ghassan Jaoudat Ismail
Sex: M Title: General DOB: 1960 POB: DrekishJunaynat Ruslan – Darkoush, Tartous region, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Ismael
Justification: Head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service since 2019. Former deputy director of the Air Force Intelligence Service and previously in charge of the missions branch of the Air Force Intelligence Service which, in cooperation with the special operations branch, manages the elite troops of the Air Force Intelligence Service, who play an important role in the repression conducted by the Syrian regime. As such, Ghassan Jaoudat Ismail is one of the top military leaders directly implementing the violent repression of opponents conducted by the Syrian regime as well as practices of disappearance of civilians. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-12694 Name: Amer al-Achi
Sex: M Title: Major General Good quality a.k.a.: a) Amis (Ammar) b) Ibrahim c) al Ashi (Aachi, Ashi)
Justification: AppointedFormer Governor of the Sweida GovernorateGovernorate, appointed by President Bashar al‐ Assad onal-Assad in Jul 2016. Former Head of the intelligence branch of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service (2012- 20162012-2016). Through his role in the Air Force Intelligence Service, Amer al-Achi is implicated in the repression of the Syrian opposition. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 12 Jun 2018, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-22375 Name: Hala Mohammad Al Nasser
Sex: M W DOB: 1964 POB: Raqqa, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Mohamed (Muhammad, Mohammed)
Justification: Former Minister of Tourism. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 23 Jun 2014, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-22439 Name: Ali Hadar
Sex: M DOB: 1962 Good quality a.k.a.: Haidar
Justification: Head of the National Reconciliation Agency and former State Minister for National Reconciliation Affairs. Chair of the Intifada wing of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 17 Jul 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-29819 Name: Mohamad Amer Mardini
Sex: M DOB: 1959 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Mohammad (Mohamed) b) Al-Mardini
Justification: Former Minister of Higher Education in power after May 2011 (appointed 27.8.2014). As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 17 Dec 2014, amended on 16 Jun 2017, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-29895 Name: Ghassan Ahmed GhannanGhannam
Sex: M Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ahmad b) GhanemGhannan (Ghanem) c) Brigadier General (Major General)
Justification: Member of the Syrian Armed Forces of the rank of Colonel and the equivalent or higher in post after May 2011. Major General and Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade. Associated with Maher al‐ Assadal-Assad through his role in the 155th Missile Brigade. As Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade, he is supporting the Syrian regime and he is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population. Responsible for firing scud missiles at various civilian sites between Jan and Mar 2013. Relation: Related to Maher Al-Assad (SSID 200-11625) Other information: a) Position: Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade b) Rank: Major General Modifications: Listed on 17 Dec 2014, amended on 11 Oct 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-29902 Name: Mohammed Bilal
Sex: M Title: Brigadier General Good quality a.k.a.: a) Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Bilal
b) Muhammad
Justification: As a senior officer in the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Service, he supports the Syrian regime and is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population. He is also associated with the listed Scientific Studies Research Centre (SSRC). Head of the Tartus police since Dec 2018.SSRC). Relation: Related to the Centre d’études et de recherches syrien (CERS) (SSID 200-12445) Modifications: Listed on 17 Dec 2014, amended on 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-30662 Name: Emad Hamsho
Sex: M Good quality a.k.a.: a) Imad b) Hmisho (Hamchu, Hamcho, Hamisho, Hmeisho, Hemasho) Address: Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Occupies a senior management position in Hamsho Trading. As a result of his senior position in Hamsho Trading, a subsidiary of Hamsho International, which has been designated by the Council, he provides support to the Syrian regime. He is also associated with a designated entity, Hamsho International. He is also vice-president of the Syrian Council of Iron and Steel alongside designated regime businessmen such as Ayman Jaber. He is also an associate of President Bashar al-Assad. Relation: a) Related to Hamcho International (SSID 200-12352) b) Related to Bashar Al-Assad (SSID 200-11614) Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015, amended on 19 Jan 2016, 11 Oct 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-36374 Name: Salam Mohammad al-Saffaf
Sex: M W DOB: 1979
Justification: Administrative Development Minister. Appointed in Mar 2017. Modifications: Listed on 16 Jun 2017, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-40037 Name: Samer Foz
Sex: M DOB: 20 May 1973 POB: a) LatakiaHoms, Syrian Arab Republic b) Latakia, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Samir b) Foz (Fawz) c) Zuhair Foz (Foz bin Zuhair) d) Fawz Address: Platinum Tower, office No 2405, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Nationality: a) Syrian Arab Republic b) Turkey Identification document: a) Passport No. U 09471711, Turkey, Expiry date: 21 Jul 2024 b) Other No. 06010274705, Syrian Arab Republic (Syrian national number)
Justification: Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests and activities in multiple sectors of Syria’s economy, including a regime-backed joint venture involved in the development of Marota City, a luxury residential and commercial development. Samer Foz provides financial and other support to the Syrian regime, including funding the Military Security Shield Forces in Syria and brokering grain deals. He also benefits financially from access to commercial opportunities through the wheat trade and reconstruction projects as a result of his links to the regime. Other information: a) Position: CEO of Aman Group b) Executive President of Aman Group. Subsidiaries: Foz for Trading, Al-Mohaimen for Transportation & Contracting. Aman Group is the private sector partner in joint venture Aman Damascus JSC with Damascus Cham Holding, in which Foz is an individual shareholder. Emmar Industries is a joint venture between Aman Group and the Hamisho Group, in which Foz has the majority stake and is the Chairman. Modifications: Listed on 17 Jul 2019, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-40082 Name: Khaled al-Zubaidi
Sex: M Good quality a.k.a.: a) Khalid b) Mohammed c) Bassam d) Zubaidi (Zubedi, al- Zubedi) Nationality: Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with significant investments in the construction industry, including a 50 % stake in Zubaidi and Qalei LLC, which is constructing the luxury tourist city Grand Town and to which the regime has granted a 45-year agreement in return for 19-21 % of its revenue. In this capacity he is linked to Nader Qalei. Khaled al- Zubaidi benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime through his business activities, in particular through this stake in the Grand Town development. Relation: Related to Nader Qalei (SSID 200-40113) Other information: Position: Co-owner of Zubaidi and Qalei LLC; Director of Agar Investment Company; General Manager of Al Zubaidi company and Al Zubaidi & Al Taweet Contracting Company; Director and Owner of Zubaidi Development Company; co-owner of Enjaz Investment Company Modifications: Listed on 17 Jul 2019, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-41320 Name: Amer Foz
Sex: M DOB: 11 Mar 1976 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Zuhair b) Fawz Nationality: a) Syrian Arab Republic b) Saint Kitts and Nevis Identification document: PassportResidence Permit No. 06010274747, Syrian784-1976-7135283-5, United Arab RepublicEmirates Justification: a) Leading businessperson with personal and family business interests and activities in multiple sectors of the Syrian economy, including through Aman Holding (formerly known as the Aman Group). Through Aman Holding, heeconomy. He benefits financially from access to commercial opportunities and supports the Syrian regime, including through involvement in the regime-backed development of Marota City. Since 2012regime. Between 2012 and 2019, he has also beenwas General Manager of ASM International Trading LLC. b) He is also associated with his brother Samer Foz, who has been designated by the Council since Jan 2019 as a leading businessperson operating in Syria and for supporting or benefiting from the regimeregime. Together with his brother, he implements a number of commercial projects, notably in the Adra al-Ummaliyya area (Damascus suburbs). These projects include a factory that manufactures cables and cable accessories as well as a project to produce electricity using solar power. They also engaged in various activities with ISIL (Da’esh) on behalf of the Assad regime, including the provision of weapons and ammunitions in exchange for wheat and oil. Relation: a) Brother of Samer Foz (SSID 200-40037) b) Linked to Aman Damascus Joint Stock Company (SSID 200- 40136) Other information: a) Position: General ManagerFounder of ASM International General Trading LLC (ASM International Trading)District 6 Company; Founding partner of Easy life Company; b) Relatives/business associates/entities or partners/links: Samer Foz; Vice Chairman of Asas Steel Company; Aman Holding (Aman Damascus Joint Stock Company); ASM International General Trading LLC (ASM International Trading)Holding c) National no: 06010274747, Passport no: 002-14-L169340 Modifications: Listed on 27 Feb 2020, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-41361 Name: Adel Anwar Al-Olabi
Sex: M DOB: 1976 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Adil b) Anouar c) el-Oulabi Nationality: Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: a) Leading businessperson benefiting from and supporting the Syrian regime. Vice Chairman of Damascus Cham Holding Company (DCHC), the investment arm of the Governorate of Damascus managing the properties of the Governorate of Damascus and

and 3 entity:

SSID: 200-12342 Name: Bena Properties
Address: Cham Holding Building, Daraa Highway,, P.O.Box 9525, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya Rif Dimashq, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Controlled by Rami Makhlouf. Syria’s largest real estate company and the real estate and investment arm of Cham Holding; provides funding to the Syrian regime. Relation: a) Controlled by Rami Makhlouf (SSID 200-11672) b) Related to Cham Holding (SSID 200-12406) Modifications: Amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-41370 Name: Damascus Cham Holding Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Damascus Cham Private Joint Stock Company
Justification: a) Damascus Cham Holding Company was established by the regime as the investment arm of the Governorate of Damascus in order to manage the properties of the Governorate of Damascus and implement the Marota City project, a luxurious real estate project based on expropriated land under Decree No. 66 and Law No. 10 in particular. b) By managing the implementation of Marota City, Damascus Cham Holding (whose Vice- ChairChairman is the Governor of Damascus) supports and benefits from the Syrian regime and provides benefits to businesspeople with close ties to the regime who have struck lucrative deals with this entity through public‐ privatepublic-private partnerships. Relation: a) Related to Adel Anwar Al-Olabi (SSID 200-41361) b) Related to Rami Makhlouf (SSID 200- 11672) c) Related to Samer Foz (SSID 200-40037) d) Related to Mazin Al-Tarazi (SSID 200-40028) e) Related to Anas Talas (SSID 200-40010) f) Related to Khaled al-Zubaidi (SSID 200-40082) g) Related to Nader Qalei (SSID 200-40113) Other information: a) Type of entity: public-owned company under private law b) Business sector: real estate development c) Name of Director/Management: Adel Anwar al-Olabi, Vice-ChairChairman of the Board of Directors and Governor of Damascus (designated by the Council) d) Ultimate beneficial owner: Governorate of Damascus e) Relatives/business associates/entities or partners/links: Rami Makhlouf (designated by the Council); Samer Foz (designated by the Council); Mazen Tarazi (designated by the Council); Talas Group, owned by businessman Anas Talas (designated by the Council); Khaled al‐ Zubaidial-Zubaidi (designated by the Council); Nader Qalei (designated by the Council) Modifications: Listed on 27 Feb 2020, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

SSID: 200-41390 Name: Al Qatarji Company
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Qatarji International Group b) Al-Sham and Al-Darwish Company c) شركةقاطرخي/مجموعة )KhatirjiQatarji Group (KatarjiKhatirji Group, Katarji Group, Katerji Group) d Address: Mazzah, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Prominent company operating across multiple sectors of the Syrian economy. By facilitating fuel, arms and ammunition trade between the regime and various actors
including ISIS (DaeshISIL (Da’esh) under the pretext of importing and exporting food items, supporting militias fighting alongside the regime and taking advantage of its ties with the regime to expand its commercial activity, Al Qatarji Company – whose board is headed by designated person Hussam al-Qatarjial-Qatirji, a member of the Syrian People’s Assembly – supports and benefits from the Syrian regime. Relation: Related to Hussam Al-Qatirji (SSID 200-40061) Other information: a) Type of entity: private company b) Business sector: import/export; trucking; supply of oil and commodities c) Name of Director/Management: Hussam al‐ Qatirjial-Qatirji, CEO (designated by the Council) d) Ultimate beneficial owner: Hussam al‐ Qatirjial-Qatirji (designated by the Council) e) Relatives/business associates/entities or partners/links: Arvada/Arfada Petroleum Company JSC Modifications: Listed on 27 Feb 2020, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021

Syria sanctions designations. Additionally, they removed the following additional listings:

SSID: 200-11841 Name: Ali Habib Mahmoud
Sex: M Title: General DOB: 1939 POB: Tartous, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Habeeb
Justification: Former Minister of Defence. Associated with the Syrian regime and the Syrian military, and its violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, de-listed on 11 Jun 2021
SSID: 200-22363 Name: Waleed Al Mo’allem
Sex: M DOB: 17 Jul 1941 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Walid b) Al Moallem (Muallem)
Justification: Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 19 Jan 2016, 12 Jun 2018, 26 Jun 2020, de-listed on 11 Jun 2021
SSID: 200-28004 Name: Ahmad al-Qadri
Sex: M DOB: 1956
Justification: Former Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Minister. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 5 Aug 2014, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 30 Oct 2020, de-listed on 11 Jun 2021
SSID: 200-40113 Name: Nader Qalei
Sex: M DOB: 9 Jul 1965 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Kalai (Kalei) Address: Young Avenue, Halifax, Canada Nationality: Syrian Arab Republic Identification document: a) Passport No. N 010170320, Syrian Arab Republic, Date of issue: 24 May 2015, Expiry date: 23 May 2021 (Issue number: 002-15-L062672) b) ID card No. 010-40036453, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with significant investments in the construction industry, including a 50 % stake in Zubaidi and Qalei LLC, which is constructing the luxury tourist city Grand Town and to which the regime has granted a 45-year agreement in return for 19-21 % of its revenue. In this capacity, he is linked to Khaled al-Zubaidi. Nader Qalei benefits from and/or supports the Syrian regime through his business activities, in
particular through this stake in the Grand Town development. Relation: Related to Khaled al-Zubaidi (SSID 200-40082) Other information: a) Position: Majority shareholder of Castle Investment Holding; co-owner of Zubaidi and Qalei LLC; Chairman of Kalai Industries Management b) Relatives/business associates or partners/links to listed individuals: Khaled al-Zubaidi Modifications: Listed on 17 Jul 2019, amended on 26 Jun 2020, de-listed on 11 Jun 2021
SSID: 200-40359 Name: Mohammad Maen Zein Jazba Al-Abidin
Sex: M DOB: 1962 POB: Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Former Minister of Industry. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 17 Jul 2019, amended on 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 30 Oct 2020, de-listed on 11 Jun 2021

Note: 3 of the individual listings appear to have no changes to them. I looked carefully – I think it’s SECO’s error and not my eyesight.

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

June 17, 2021: OFAC issues COVID-related General Licenses for Syria, Iran & Venezuela programs

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Issuance of Syria General License 21, Venezuela General License 39, and Iran General License N, “Authorizing Certain Activities to Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic” and Associated Frequently Asked Questions

Release date06/17/2021

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Syria General License 21, Venezuela General License 39, and Iran General License N, “Authorizing Certain Activities to Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic” and related Frequently Asked Questions (906, 907, 908, 909, 910, and 911).

And there were a bunch of new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs):

906. What do Iran General License (GL) N, Syria GL 21, and Venezuela GL 39 authorize with respect to the fight against the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)?  How do these GLs differ from OFAC’s existing humanitarian exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations?Answer

In order to further aid the global fight against COVID-19, OFAC has issued time-limited general licenses, Iran GL NSyria GL 21, and Venezuela GL 39 (together, the COVID-19-related GLs), to provide broad authorizations for certain COVID-19-related transactions and activities.  The new general licenses expand upon longstanding humanitarian exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations in OFAC sanctions programs, which remain in effect (see OFAC’s April 16, 2020 Fact Sheet on the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19) to cover additional COVID 19-related transactions and activities.  For example, Iran GL Nexpands authorizations under the Iran sanctions program to cover certain items that previously would have required a specific license for exportation or reexportation to Iran, such as certain COVID-19 testing or vaccine manufacturing equipment.  Both U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons whose activities are within U.S. jurisdiction — including exporters, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and financial institutions — may rely upon the authorizations in these COVID-19-related GLs provided they meet the applicable conditions.  All three GLs expire on June 17, 2022.

The COVID-19-related GLs provide authorization that is independent of OFAC’s other humanitarian-related authorizations.  Accordingly, conditions and limitations included in other humanitarian-related authorizations do not apply to transactions and activities conducted pursuant to the COVID-19-related GLs, unless explicitly incorporated therein.  For example, for sales to Iran of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices pursuant to the general license in 31 C.F.R. § 560.530, payment terms and financing must be limited to and consistent with those authorized by 31 C.F.R. § 560.532.  However, because Iran GL N does not incorporate similar limitations on payment terms, COVID-19-related exports and reexports to Iran authorized by Iran GL N are not subject to the payment terms in 31 C.F.R. § 560.532.

Prior to the expiration of the COVID-19-related GLs, OFAC may issue additional guidance, as appropriate. OFAC’s longstanding humanitarian exemptions, exceptions and authorizations in each of these sanctions programs will not be impacted by the expiration of these GLs. For transactions not otherwise authorized or exempt, OFAC considers license requests on a case-by-case basis and prioritizes applications, compliance questions, and other requests related to humanitarian support for people in areas subject to comprehensive sanctions.

907. For the purposes of Iran General License (GL) N, what are goods or technology for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)?  What transactions and activities related to the export or reexport of these items are authorized?Answer

For the purposes of Iran GL N, covered COVID-19-related goods or technology include, for example:  medical gowns; medical eye shields and goggles; surgical gloves; face shields; respirators and masks such as N95, N99, and N100 masks; personal hygiene products such as soap and hand sanitizer and other water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies such as: water purification supplies and hygiene promotion materials; vaccines and vaccine ingredients or components required for the production of vaccines; equipment, supplies, and containers for transporting, storing, and administering vaccines; COVID-19 testing kits and equipment, and software and technology for processing such kits; equipment, software, and technology for diagnostic imaging tests; ventilators or components thereof; oxygen tanks and supplies to deliver oxygen; supplies, medicines, or other therapies to treat COVID-19; and field hospitals or mobile medical units, provided that all conditions and limitations of Iran GL N are satisfied, including with regard to the classification of certain goods and technology set forth in paragraph (d)(1) of Iran GL N.  Certain COVID-19-related medical devices designated as EAR99 that would otherwise require a specific license for exportation or reexportation to Iran because they are included on OFAC’s List of Medical Devices Requiring Specific Authorization — such as High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filtration Systems and HEPA filters — would not require a specific license for exportation or reexportation to Iran, provided that all conditions and limitations of Iran GL N are satisfied.

Transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of such goods or technology include, for example:  processing and transfer of funds; payment of taxes, fees, and import duties; purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services; making of shipping and cargo inspection arrangements; obtaining of insurance; arrangement of financing and payment; shipping and storage of the goods; receipt of payment; and entry into contracts (including executory contracts), provided that all conditions and limitations of Iran GL N are satisfied.  Certain transactions and activities involving the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are also authorized under Iran GL N.

As noted in Iran GL N, this general license does not authorize the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V, including property of the Government of Iran.

908. For the purposes of Iran General License (GL) N and Syria GL 21, what are services related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)?  What transactions and activities related to the export or, in the case of Iran GL N, import of these services are authorized?Answer

For the purposes of Iran GL N and Syria GL 21, services related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 include, for example:  treatment of patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19; training necessary for the safe and effective use, repair, or maintenance of goods for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19; water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion materials and supplies, and shelter activities to prevent or treat COVID-19, including Risk Communication and Community Engagement efforts related to COVID-19, and other goods and services, directly related to prevention or treatment of COVID-19; conduct of research into COVID-19; services necessary for the operation, maintenance, or repair of goods for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19; collaboration on the development or enhancement of information related to COVID-19 to the extent not authorized or exempt; development of medical devices or medicines to counteract COVID-19; conduct of clinical studies in connection with COVID-19; provision of public education in connection with COVID-19; and disposal of medical waste in connection with COVID-19, provided all conditions and limitations of Iran GL N or Syria GL 21 are satisfied.

Transactions and activities related to the exportation or reexportation of such services include, for example:  processing and transfer of funds; payment of taxes, fees, and import duties; purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services; making of shipping or cargo inspection arrangements; obtaining of insurance; arrangement of financing and payment; delivery of services; receipt of payment; and entry into contracts (including executory contracts), provided all conditions of Iran GL N or Syria GL 21 are satisfied.

As noted in Iran GL N and Syria GL 21, these general licenses do not authorize the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V, including property of the Government of Iran or property of the Government of Syria

909. For the purposes of Venezuela General License (GL) 39, what are transactions and activities related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)?Answer

For the purposes of Venezuela GL 39, transactions and activities related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 in Venezuela include, for example:  the export or import of goods and services, and transactions and activities related thereto, in each case that would otherwise be prohibited due to the involvement of the Government of Venezuela, certain blocked financial institutions as described in Venezuela GL 39, or both, provided all conditions and limitations in the GL are satisfied.

COVID-19-related goods or technology include, for example:  medical gowns; medical eye shields and goggles; surgical gloves; face shields; respirators and masks such as N95, N99, and N100 masks; personal hygiene products such as soap and hand sanitizer and other water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies; vaccines and vaccine ingredients or components required for the production of vaccines; equipment, supplies, and containers for transporting, storing, and administering vaccines; personal protective equipment; COVID-19 testing kits and equipment, software and technology for processing such kits; equipment, software, and technology for diagnostic imaging tests; ventilators or components thereof; oxygen tanks and supplies to deliver oxygen; supplies, medicines, or other therapies to treat COVID-19; and field hospitals or mobile medicals units, provided that all conditions and limitations of Venezuela GL 39 are satisfied.

COVID-19-related services include, for example:  treatment of patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19; training necessary to the safe and effective use of goods for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19; conduct of research into COVID-19; services necessary for the operation, maintenance, or repair of goods for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19; collaboration on the development or enhancement of information related to COVID-19 to the extent not authorized or exempt; development of medical devices or medicines to counteract COVID-19; conduct of clinical studies in connection with COVID-19; provision of public education in connection with COVID-19; disposal of medical waste in connection with COVID-19; water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion materials and supplies, and shelter activities to prevent or treat COVID-19, including Risk Communication and Community Engagement efforts related to COVID-19, and other goods and services, directly related to prevention or treatment of COVID-19; provided all conditions and limitations in Venezuela GL 39 are satisfied.

Other transactions and activities related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 in Venezuela include, for example, when in connection with COVID-19-related goods, technology, or services:  processing and transfer of funds, payment of taxes, fees, and import duties; purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services; making of shipping or cargo inspection arrangements; obtaining of insurance; arrangement of financing and payment; shipping of goods; delivery of services; receipt of payment; and entry into contracts (including executory contracts), provided all conditions and limitations in Venezuela GL 39 are satisfied.

As noted in Venezuela GL 39, this general license does not authorize the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V, including property of the Government of Venezuela or certain specified blocked financial institutions listed in Venezuela GL 39.

910. What are the due diligence expectations of U.S. financial institutions associated with processing fund transfers or trade finance transactions that are authorized by Iran General License (GL) N, Syria GL 21, and Venezuela GL 39?Answer

U.S. financial institutions are authorized to process transfers of funds or engage in trade finance transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to the transactions and activities authorized by Iran GL NSyria GL 21, and Venezuela GL 39.

Such financial institutions may rely on the originator of the funds transfer with regard to compliance with Iran GL N, Syria GL 21, and Venezuela GL 39, provided that the financial institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with such GLs.

911. Do non-U.S. persons risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in certain activities to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic that U.S. persons would be authorized to engage in under Iran General License (GL) N, Syria GL 21, or Venezuela GL 39?Answer

No.  Non-U.S. persons do not risk exposure under U.S. sanctions for engaging in certain activities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic that would be authorized under Iran GL NSyria GL 21, or Venezuela GL 39, as appropriate, if engaged in by a U.S. person.  This includes non-U.S. exporters, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and foreign financial institutions, as well as other non-U.S. persons engaging in certain activities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

For additional information on humanitarian activities by non-U.S. persons in relation to sanctioned jurisdictions, please see FAQs 844, 884, and 885. For information specific to the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan people, please see OFAC’s August 6, 2019 Fact Sheet: Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Support to the Venezuelan People. For more information on other relevant exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations for humanitarian assistance and trade to combat COVID-19 under OFAC’s sanctions program, please see OFAC’s April 16, 2020 Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19.


Links:

OFAC Notice

Syria General License 21

Venezuela General License 39

Iran General License N

New FAQs – 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911

OFSI removes 2: 1 from Belarus, 1 from Syria

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2 entries removed from the consolidated list

1 entity has been removed from the Belarus financial sanctions regime.

The following entity has been removed from the consolidated list and is no longer subject to an asset freeze:

  • Agat System (Group ID: 14041)

Further, 1 individual has been removed from the Syria financial sanctions regime. The notice can be found here.

The following individual has been removed from the consolidated list and is no longer subject to an asset freeze:

  • Nader Qalei (Group ID: 13763)

This follows an update to the UK Sanctions List, made on 8 July 2021.

OFSI’s consolidated list of asset freeze targets has been updated to reflect these changes.

For some odd reason, the email notice only provided a link to the Belarus update – here’s the full listing:

AGAT SYSTEM
Address: 51B F.Skoryny Street, Minsk, Belarus, 220141.Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):BEL0061 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons):AGAT Electromechanical Plant JSC is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry (SAMI), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the state. The company manufactures the ‘Rubezh’ (Frontier), a barrier system designed for riot control which has subsequently been shown to have been deployed during the demonstrations that have taken place in the wake of the August 9 Presidential election. AGAT therefore bears responsibility for providing support, equipment and technology for police and security forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which have contributed to serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society following the August 9 elections. (Phone number):00375(17)2675434 (Website):www.agat-system.by (Email address):info@agat-system.by (Organisation type):State Owned Enterprise Listed on: 18/12/2020 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 08/07/2021 Group ID: 14041.

Link:

OFSI Belarus notice

Ah… last week’s OFSI Syria update has been found

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So, when OFSI sends out a sanctions notice, they provide a link to the underlying document – it’s a little black box that says “click here”.

Well, last week, they used one notice to update both the Belarus and Syria programs – but only had one little black box (for Belarus). I wrote back to HM Treasury and did not hear back.

Well, it happened again today. And, in looking at the email, I see what they did… they included the 2nd link in the text – here’s today’s:

Further, 1 individual has been amended in the Syria financial sanctions regime. The notice can be found here.

So, I went back and looked at last week’s Syria update, for which I had not seen that… and it’s there… so, here is the full listing for the person who was delisted on the 8th from the Syria program:

QALEI, Nader
DOB: 09/07/1965. POB: Damascus, Syria a.k.a: (1) KALAI, Nader (2) KALEI, Nader Nationality: Syrian Passport Details: N 010170320. Issue number: 002-15-L062672. Date of issue: 24.5.2015. Date of expiry: 23.5.2021. National Identification no: 010- 40036453 (Syrian Arab Republic) Address: Young Avenue, Halifax, Canada. Position: (1) Majority shareholder of Castle Investment Holding (2) Co-owner of Zubaidi and Qalei LLC (3) Chairman of Kalai Industries Management Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):SYR0267 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifiying Information):Linked to Khaled al-Zubaidi. (UK Statement of Reasons):Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with significant investments in the construction industry, including a 50% stake in Zubaidi and Qalei LLC, which is constructing the luxury tourist city Grand Town and to which the regime has granted a 45-year agreement in return for 19-21 % of its revenue. In this capacity, he is linked to Khaled al-Zubaidi. Nader Qalei benefits from and/or supports the regime through his business activities, in particular through this stake in the Grand Town development. (Gender):Male Listed on: 22/01/2019 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 08/07/2021 Group ID: 13763.

Link:

OFSI Notice

Today’s OFSI updates: 2 changed Belarus listings, 1 changed Syrian

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Today, UK regulators updated these Belarus listings – 1 individual:

CHURO, Leanid Mikalaievich
DOB: 08/07/1956. a.k.a: (1) CHURO, Leanid, Mikalaevich (2) CHURO, Leonid, Nikolaevich (3) CHURO, Lieanid, Mikalajevich Nationality: Belarusian Position: Director General, Belaeronavigatsia Republican Unitary Air Navigation Services Enterprise Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):BEL0098 (UK Statement of Reasons):In his position as Director General of Belaeronavigatsia Republican Unitary Air Navigation Services Enterprise, Leanid Churo is responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for the order to intercept passenger flight FR4978 and compel its landing at Minsk airport, without proper justification, on 23 May 2021. In doing so, it acted on the direction of Alexander Lukashenko and in conjunction with the Belarusian defence forces. This resulted in the forced redirection of flight FR4978, the detention of the aircraft, its passengers and the crew, and the arrest of opposition journalist and civil society actor Roman Protasevich and Protasevich’s partner Sofia Sapega. This politically- motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Protasevich and Sapega and constitutes a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. Churo is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus and so undermined democracy and the rule of law there. (Gender):Male Listed on: 21/06/2021 Last Updated: 21/06/2021 12/07/2021 Group ID: 14115.

and one entity:

BELAERONAVIGATSIA REPUBLICAN UNITARY AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES ENTERPRISE a.k.a: Belaeronavigatsia State-Owned Enterprise Address: 19 Korotkevic Street, Minsk, Belarus, 220039.Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):BEL0108 (UK Statement of Reasons):Belaeronavigatsia Republican Unitary Air Navigation Services Enterprise is responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. It therefore bears responsibility for the order to intercept passenger flight FR4978 and compel its landing at Minsk airport, without proper justification, on 23 May 2021. In doing so, it acted on the direction of Alexander Lukashenko and in conjunction with the Belarusian defence forces. This resulted in the detention of the aircraft, its passengers and the crew, and the arrest of opposition journalist and civil society actor Roman Protasevich and Protasevich’s partner Sofia Sapega. This politically-motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Protasevich and Sapega and constitutes a form of repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. Belaeronavigatsia is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus and so undermined democracy and the rule of law there. (Phone number):Tel: +375 (17) 215-40-51. Fax: +375 (17) 213-41-63 (Email address):office@ban.by (Organisation type):State Owned Enterprise (Subsidiaries):(1) Brest branch (2) Vitsebsk branch (3) Gomel branch (4) Grodno branch (5) Mogilev branch Listed on: 21/06/2021 Last Updated: 21/06/2021 12/07/2021 Group ID: 14082.

and this Syria listing:

TOHME, Salam
Title: Dr a.k.a: (1) TAAME, Salam (2) TAAME, Salim (3) TA'MAH, Salam (4) TA'MAH, Salim (5) TOHMA, Salam (6) TOHMA, Salim (7) TOHME, Salim (8) TOUMAH, Salam (9) TOUMAH, Salim Address: Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), Barzeh Street, PO Box 4470, Damascus, Syria. Position: Deputy Director General, Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):SYR0214 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons):Deputy Director General of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) which is responsible for the development and production of non-conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. Due to her senior position at SSRC, she is associated with designated entity SSRC. (Gender):Female Male Listed on: 19/03/2018 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 12/07/2021 Group ID: 13622.

Links:

OFSI Notices – Belarus, Syria

Two in a week: Payoneer pays OFAC $1,400,301.40 for violating multiple sanctions programs

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So, Payoneer apparently violated a number of programs by processing 2,241 payments for parties in Iran, Sudan, Syria and Crimea… and another payments on behalf of parties on the SDN List. The value of the transactions? Less than the fine – only $802,117.36. Why? Because those 2241 violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed (although they were all non-egregious).

The why is a who’s-who of previous enforcement actions – see if you can remember who else had similar issues:

The Apparent Violations, which related to commercial transactions processed by Payoneer on behalf of its corporate customers and card-issuing financial institutions, resulted from multiple sanctions compliance control breakdowns, including (i) weak algorithms that allowed close matches to SDN List entries not to be flagged by its filter, (ii) failure to screen for Business Identifier Codes (BICs) even when SDN List entries contained them, (iii) during backlog periods, allowing flagged and pended payments to be automatically released without review, and (iv) lack of focus on sanctioned locations, especially Crimea, because it was not monitoring IP addresses or flagging addresses in sanctioned locations.

Now, that $1,400,301.40? It represents a big discount from the base penalty of $3,889,726. Here’s how OFAC looked at the matter:

OFAC determined the following to be aggravating factors:
1) Payoneer failed to exercise a minimal degree of caution or care for its sanctions compliance obligations when it allowed persons on the SDN List and persons in sanctioned locations to open accounts and transact as a result of deficient sanctions compliance processes that persisted for a number of years;
2) Payoneer had reason to know the location of the users it subsequently identified as located in jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions based on common indicators of location within its possession, including billing, shipping, or IP addresses, or copies of identification issued in jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions; and
3) The Apparent Violations caused harm to six different sanctions programs.
OFAC determined the following to be mitigating factors:
1) Upon discovering potential sanctions compliance issues, senior management acted quickly to self-disclose the Apparent Violations related to blocked persons and provided substantial cooperation throughout the investigation;
2) Payoneer has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the Apparent Violations;
3) Payoneer has represented that it has terminated the conduct that led to the Apparent Violations and undertook the following remedial measures intended to minimize the risk of recurrence of similar conduct in the future:

• Replacing its Chief Compliance Officer, retraining all compliance employees, and hiring new compliance positions focused specifically on testing;
• Enhancing its screening software to include financial institution alias names and BIC codes and automatically triggering a manual review of payments or accounts that match persons on the SDN List;
• Enabling the screening of names, shipping and billing addresses, and IP information associated with account holders to identify jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions;
• Pending transactions flagged by its filter instead of allowing them to complete during a backlog; and
• A daily review of identification documents uploaded to Payoneer, and a rule engine that stops payments with identification indicating jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions.
4) As part of its agreement with OFAC, Payoneer has undertaken to continue its implementation of these and other compliance commitments.

Did you notice that they replaced their Chief Compliance Officer? I think I’d like to see the Settlement Agreement – something tells me there is something more to the story such that OFAC would mention that in the Enforcement Information…. Just saying.

And OFAC’s lesson to learn here? Not so interesting, but here it is:

This action highlights that money services businesses—like all financial service providers—are responsible for ensuring that they do not engage in unauthorized transactions prohibited by OFAC sanctions, such as dealings with blocked persons or property, or engaging in prohibited trade-related transactions with jurisdictions and regions subject to sanctions. To mitigate such risks, money services businesses should develop a tailored, risk-based sanctions compliance program. OFAC’s Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments notes that each risk-based sanctions compliance program will vary depending on a variety of factors, including the company’s size and sophistication, products and services, customers and counterparties, and geographic locations, but should be predicated on and incorporate at least five essential components of compliance: (1) management commitment; (2) risk assessment; (3) internal controls; (4) testing and auditing; and (5) training.
Within that framework, this enforcement action emphasizes the importance of effective screening not only for persons on the SDN List but also for sanctioned locations; ensuring that audits of OFAC compliance programs focus not only on persons on the SDN List but also on sanctioned locations; performing algorithm testing to be sure filters are flagging payments within expected parameters; screening for BIC codes, especially when OFAC includes them in SDN List entries; and holding flagged payments until they have been reviewed.

Link:

OFAC Enforcement Information

OFAC adds to counter-terror, Syria & Syria-related programs… and makes some updates

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OFAC today added the following persons:

AL-SHABAN, Hasan (a.k.a. ALSHABAN, Hasan Suliman), Manbij, Syria; Sahinbey, Gaziantep, Turkey; DOB 07 Jan 1987; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Passport 02812L004397 (Syria); Identification Number 02120304806 (Syria); alt. Identification Number N006695928 (Syria); alt. Identification Number 99071138750 (Turkey) (individual) [SDGT]. 

FAYZIMATOV, Farrukh Furkatovitch (a.k.a. AL-SHAMI, Faruk; a.k.a. ASH-SHAMI, Faruk; a.k.a. FAYZIMATOV, Faruk Furkatovich; a.k.a. SHAMI, Faruk; a.k.a. SHAMI, Faruq (Cyrillic: ШАМИ, Фарук)), Idlib, Syria; DOB 02 Mar 1996; citizen Tajikistan; Gender Male; Digital Currency Address - XBT 17a5bpKvEp1j1Trs4qTbcNZrby53JbaS9C (individual) [SDGT].

to its counter-terrorism sanctions program, and:

AL-DEKER, Asef (a.k.a. AL-DIKR, Asf; a.k.a. DAKKAR, Asef), Syria; DOB 1965; POB Jableh, Beit Yashout, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Brigadier General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

AL-DIB, Ahmed (Arabic: احمد الدیب) (a.k.a. DEEB, Ahmad; a.k.a. DEEB, Ahmed; a.k.a. DIB, Ahmad; a.k.a. DIB, Ahmed (Arabic: احمد دیب); a.k.a. DIBE, Ahmad; a.k.a. DIBE, Ahmed (Arabic: احمد دیبئ)), Damascus, Syria; DOB 1961; POB Ayn Al-Tineh Village, Latakia, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Brigadier General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

HABIB, Malik Ali (Arabic: مالک علئ حبیب), Palmyra, Syria; DOB 04 Jan 1963; POB Jablah Latakia, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

NASSER, Wafiq (Arabic: وفیق ناصر) (a.k.a. NASER, Wafiq; a.k.a. NASSEER, Wafiq), Aleppo, Syria; DOB 10 Jul 1964; POB Jableh, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Brigadier General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

to its Syria sanctions program, and:

AL-HAYES, Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad (Arabic: أحمد إحسان فیاض الهایس) (a.k.a. AL-HAYES, Ahmed Ihsan Fayyad; a.k.a. AL-SHAQRA, Abu Hatim; a.k.a. SHAKRA, Abu Hatem; a.k.a. SHAQRA, Abu Hatim; a.k.a. SHAQRA, Abu Hattam), Syria; DOB 1987; POB Al-Shaqra, Deir ez-Zor, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male (individual) [SYRIA-EO13894] (Linked To: AHRAR AL-SHARQIYA). 

AL-HAYES, Raed Jassim (a.k.a. AL-HAYES, Raed Jassem; a.k.a. CHAKRA, Abu Jaafar; a.k.a. SHAKRA, Abu Jaafar; a.k.a. SHAQRA, Abu Ja'far; a.k.a. SHAQRA, Abu Jafar), Syria; DOB 1985; nationality Syria; Gender Male (individual) [SYRIA-EO13894].

to its Syria-related sanctions program.

Similarly, the following entities were added to the Syria sanctions:

SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 251 - AL-KHATIB (a.k.a. "AL-KHATEEB BRANCH" (Arabic: "فرع الخطيب"); a.k.a. "BRANCH 251" (Arabic: "الفرع 251"); a.k.a. "BRANCH 251-AL-KHATEEB"; a.k.a. "THE INTERIOR BRANCH" (Arabic: "الفرع الداخلي")), al-Khatib area of Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 215 - RAIDS (a.k.a. "BRANCH 215" (Arabic: "الفرع 215"); a.k.a. "BRANCH 215: RAIDS COMPANY" (Arabic: "سرية المداهمة والاقتحام"); a.k.a. "KAFRSOUSA BRANCH"; a.k.a. "RAIDS COMPANY" (Arabic: "فرع سرية المداهمة")), Syria; 6th of May Street, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 216 (Arabic: الفرع 216) (a.k.a. "BRANCH 216: PATROLS BRANCH" (Arabic: "فرع الدوريات")), Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 227 - AL MINTAQA BRANCH (Arabic: رع المنطقة) (a.k.a. "AL-MINTAQA"; a.k.a. "AL-MINTAQA BRANCH 227"; a.k.a. "BRANCH 227" (Arabic: "الفرع 227"); a.k.a. "BRANCH 227: DAMASCUS GOVERNORATE BRANCH"), 6th of May Street, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 235 - PALESTINE (a.k.a. "BRANCH 235" (Arabic: "الفرع 235"); a.k.a. "BRANCH 235: PALESTINE BRANCH" (Arabic: "فرع فلسطين")), Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 248 - INVESTIGATION (Arabic: فرع التحقيق; Arabic: فرع 248) (a.k.a. BRANCH 248 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (Arabic: فرع التحقيق العسكري)), Al Tawajoh Street, Alsyasi Street, 6th of May Street, Damascus, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 290 - ALEPPO BRANCH (a.k.a. "BRANCH 290"), Aleppo, Syria [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

and to the Syria-related sanctions:

AHRAR AL-SHARQIYA (Arabic: أحرار الشرقية) (a.k.a. AHRAR AL-SHARQIAH; a.k.a. AHRAR AL-SHARQIYA BRIGADE; a.k.a. AHRAR AL-SHARQIYAH; a.k.a. AHRAR AL-SHARQIYEH; a.k.a. GATHERING OF THE FREEMEN OF THE EAST; a.k.a. TAJAMMU' AHRAR AL-SHARQIYA), Syria [SYRIA-EO13894]. 

SARAYA AL-AREEN (Arabic: سرايا العرين) (a.k.a. ABU AL-HARETH MILITIA; a.k.a. SARAYA AL-'AREEN; a.k.a. "AL-AREEN 13"), Latakia, Syria [SYRIA-EO13894].

SAYDNAYA MILITARY PRISON (Arabic: سجن صيدنايا العسكري) (a.k.a. SAIDNAYA MILITARY PRISON; a.k.a. SAYDNAYA PRISON; a.k.a. SEDNAYA PRISON (Arabic: سجن صيدنايا)), Syria [SYRIA-EO13894].

Finally, OFAC updated the following existing listings (one for Syria, and one for the Syria-related program):

MOULHEM, Kifah (Arabic: كفاح ملحم) (a.k.a. AL-MILHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MELHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MILHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MOULHIM, Kifah; a.k.a. MULHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MULHIM, Kifah), Damascus, Syria; DOB 28 Nov 1961; POB Junayrat Ruslan, Tartous, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male (individual) [SYRIA-EO13894]. -to- MOULHEM, Kifah (Arabic: كفاح ملحم) (a.k.a. AL-MILHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MELHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MILHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MOULHIM, Kifah; a.k.a. MULHEM, Kifah; a.k.a. MULHIM, Kifah), Damascus, Syria; DOB 28 Nov 1961; POB Junayrat Ruslan, Tartous, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male (individual) [SYRIA] [SYRIA-EO13894] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE). 

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, Syria [SYRIA]. -to- SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (Arabic: شعبة المخابرات العسكرية سوربا) (a.k.a. SHU'BAT AL-MUKHABARAT AL-'ASKARIYYA; a.k.a. SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE), Syria; Organization Established Date 1969 [SYRIA].

And Treasury issued press releases for the counter-terror designations:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida-Linked Financial Facilitators in Turkey and Syria

July 28, 2021

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one Turkey-based al-Qa’ida financial facilitator for materially assisting al-Qa’ida. Additionally, OFAC designated one Syria-based terrorist fundraiser and recruiter for providing material support to Hay’et Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). These designations expose the continued efforts by al-Qa’ida and HTS to use the global formal financial system and highlight the need for continued vigilance against terrorist fundraising and recruitment on the internet.

“Terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida and HTS continue to raise funds, recruit online, and exploit the international banking sector to support their ongoing terrorist activities,” said Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Andrea Gacki. “These designations underscore this Administration’s commitment to disrupting support networks of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups that seek to attack the United States and its allies.”

HASAN AL-SHABAN

Al-Shaban’s banking information was provided by an al-Qa’ida fundraiser to prospective donors as a way for them to send money to support al-Qa’ida military efforts and the so-called mujahideen fighting in Syria. Members of al-Qa’ida utilized bank accounts associated with al-Shaban to coordinate the movement of money from associates across North Africa, Western Europe, and North America, and separately used al-Shaban to coordinate the transfer of funds to Turkey.

Al-Shaban is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, al-Qa’ida.

FARRUKH FURKATOVITCH FAYZIMATOV

Fayzimatov utilizes social media to post propaganda, recruit new members, and solicit donations for HTS. Fayzimatov organized community fundraising campaigns to purchase equipment for the benefit of HTS, including motorbikes.

Fayzimatov is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of HTS.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that either knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

and for the Syria (& related) designations:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Syrian Regime Prisons, Officials, and Syrian Armed Group

July 28, 2021

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning eight Syrian prisons run by the Assad regime’s intelligence apparatus, which have been sites of human rights abuses against political prisoners and other detainees. OFAC is also designating five senior security officials of regime entities that control these detention facilities. The Assad regime has waged a ruthless war against the Syrian people, imprisoning hundreds of thousands of Syrians calling for reform and change, of whom at least 14,000 have been tortured to death. More than 130,000 people reportedly remain missing or arbitrarily detained to this day—the vast majority of whom are either presumed dead or are detained without communication with family or legal representation.

OFAC is also sanctioning Syrian armed group Ahrar al-Sharqiya, which operates in northern Syria, for abuses against civilians, and is also sanctioning two of the group’s leaders. Ahrar al-Sharqiya has committed numerous crimes against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, including unlawful killings, abductions, torture, and seizures of private property. The group has also incorporated former Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) members into its ranks. These horrific acts compound the suffering of a population that has repeatedly endured mass displacement.

“Today’s designations promote accountability for abuses committed against the Syrian people and deny rogue actors access to the international financial system,” said Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control Andrea M. Gacki. “This action demonstrates the United States’ strong commitment to targeting human rights abuses in Syria, regardless of the perpetrator.”

This action furthers the objectives of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Caesar Act), which seeks to hold the Assad regime accountable for commission of atrocities against those detained in its prisons. Many of the prisons designated today, which are operated as branches of the Syrian Military Intelligence and the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, were specifically highlighted in images provided by Caesar, a Syrian regime defector—in whose name the Caesar Act was passed into law—who worked as an official forensic photographer for the Syrian military and who bravely brought to light thousands of images of detainees who were tortured and killed.

On May 18, 2011, Treasury designated Syrian Military Intelligence, one of the four branches of Syria’s security forces, for using force against and arresting demonstrators participating in civil unrest in Syria. Syrian Military Intelligence’s notorious branches in Damascus and Aleppo have become known for the abuses committed against detainees, including numerous political prisoners, held in these facilities. On April 29, 2011, Treasury designated the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, the overarching civilian intelligence service in Syria.

Today’s actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13894 of October 14, 2019, which imposes sanctions on those responsible for, complicit in, or having engaged in commission of serious human rights abuse in Syria, as well as E.O. 13572 of September 28, 2010, which imposes sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses in Syria, as well as senior officials of, or entities owned or controlled by, persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13572.

SAYDNAYA MILITARY PRISON

Operated by Syrian Military Intelligence, Saydnaya Military Prison has a well-documented history of serious human rights abuses. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, both peaceful opponents of the regime as well as military personnel suspected of opposing the regime were detained and perished in the prison. Two buildings at the Saydnaya Military Prison site alone could contain as many as 10,000 to 20,000 detainees between them. Many prisoners have been denied food and water for prolonged periods of time and were subjected to extensive beatings. Thousands of Syrian regime dissidents reportedly have been extrajudicially executed in mass hangings at the prison and buried in mass graves. Several reports by non-governmental organizations estimate that between 5,000 and 13,000 people were executed at Saydnaya Military Prison between 2011 and 2015. Reports smuggled out from detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison since then indicated that the rate of extrajudicial killings at the prison has accelerated.

Saydnaya Military Prison is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for having engaged in the commission of serious human rights abuse.

SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

Prisons operated by Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 215, Branch 216, Branch 227, Branch 235, Branch 248, and Branch 290 reportedly have been the sites of numerous human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Assad regime since the start of the Syrian conflict. The Caesar photos revealed that 8,382 detainees were injured in detention in Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 215, Branch 216, Branch 227, Branch 235, Branch 248, and Branch 290. Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 215, Branch 216, Branch 227, Branch 235, Branch 248, and Branch 290 have all been identified by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which was established by the United Nations Human Rights Council, as facilities where death in detention and human rights abuses have occurred.

Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 215, Branch 216, Branch 227, Branch 235, Branch 248, and Branch 290 are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13572 for being owned or controlled by Syrian Military Intelligence.

Syrian Military Intelligence head Kifah Moulhem reportedly oversaw detention facilities where human rights abuses occurred. Prior to being named to his current role, Moulhem commanded Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 248, where he reportedly supervised the torture and killing of many detainees. On December 22, 2020, the U.S. Department of State designated Moulhem pursuant to E.O. 13894 for being complicit in, having directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or financed, the obstruction, disruption, or prevention of a ceasefire in northern Syria.

Wafiq Nasser, commander of Syrian Military Intelligence Branch 290, reportedly has been associated with numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations. Previously, while serving as a Colonel in Syria’s Republican Guard, Nasser participated in the regime’s first raids on Daraa, where he reportedly committed widespread abuses against civilians. Nasser was also reported to have been personally involved in the arrest and torture of a dissident within the Syrian military.

Syrian Military Intelligence Branch head Asef Al-Deker was involved in one of the largest massacres of the Syrian conflict, during which approximately 2,000 Syrian and Palestinian civilians reportedly were killed or disappeared at a Syrian Military Intelligence training school under his control.

Syrian Military Intelligence Branch head Malik Ali Habib played a major role in crimes and violations committed by the Tadmur Branch of Syrian Military Intelligence, including the murders of detainees at that branch. Dozens of bodies of deceased detainees had been seen at the Tadmur Branch during Habib’s tenure. Political prisoners reportedly under Habib’s supervision were beaten, burned, and crucified to death; officials were then forced to write reports that the prisoners died of natural causes, such as stroke and kidney failure.

Moulhem, Nasser, Al-Deker, and Habib are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13572 for being senior officials of Syrian Military Intelligence.

SYRIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GID) BRANCH 251 AND AHMED AL-DIB

GID Branch 251, led by Al-Dib, has been identified by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria which was established by the United Nations Human Rights Council, as a facility controlled by the Syrian GID where death in detention and torture have occurred. Al-Dib has a long history as a senior official of the Syrian GID and has been implicated in reports of arbitrary detention and torture of detainees since at least 2011.

Syrian General Intelligence Branch 251 is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13572 for being owned or controlled by the Syrian GID. Al-Dib is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13572 for being a senior official of the Syrian GID.

AHRAR AL-SHARQIYA

Syrian armed group Ahrar al-Sharqiya has a record of human rights abuse that includes the unlawful killing of Hevrin Khalaf, a Kurdish politician and Secretary General of the political party Future Syria, as well as her bodyguards in October 2019. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights identified the murders as a possible war crime. Ahrar al-Sharqiya has killed multiple civilians in northeast Syria, including health workers. The militia has also engaged in abductions, torture, and seizures of private property from civilians, barring displaced Syrians from returning to their homes. Ahrar al-Sharqiya constructed and controls a large prison complex outside of Aleppo where hundreds have been executed since 2018. The group has also used this prison to operate an extensive kidnapping for ransom operation targeting prominent business and opposition figures from the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. Ahrar al-Sharqiya has also integrated former ISIS members into its ranks.

Ahrar al-Sharqiya is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for having engaged in the commission of serious human rights abuse in Syria.

AHMAD IHSAN FAYYAD AL-HAYES AND RAED JASSIM AL-HAYES

Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad al-Hayes (Ahmad al-Hayes), commonly known as “Abu Hatem Shaqra,” is Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s leader and is directly complicit in many of the militia’s human rights abuses. Al-Hayes commanded Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s prison outside of Aleppo, where hundreds of detainees have been executed since 2018. Ahmad al-Hayes has been implicated in the trafficking of Yazidi women and children and has integrated former ISIS members into the ranks of Ahrar al-Sharqiya. A number of former ISIS officials had sworn allegiance to al-Hayes and worked to support Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s ransom and extortion efforts.

Raed Jassim al-Hayes (Raed al-Hayes), commonly known as “Abu Ja’afar Shaqra” and a cousin of Ahmad al-Hayes, has been the military commander of Ahrar al-Sharqiya since late 2017. As a senior figure within the militia, Raed al-Hayes has personally supervised and profited from the militia’s organized theft and sale of equipment from civilian homes and farms. He also commands former ISIS members, including a former member of an ISIS force known for frequent torture of civilians, who is now a heavy weapons official in Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

Ahmad al-Hayes and Raed al-Hayes are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

In conjunction with this action, the U.S. Department of State is sanctioning Saraya al-Areen, a militia affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army, an entity which has been engaged in combat since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, including a 2020 operation in Idlib designed to return that province to regime control. Saraya al-Areen is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, the obstruction, disruption, or prevention of a ceasefire in northern Syria.

View more information about the State Department’s action here.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND TRADE TO SYRIA

OFAC remains committed to ensuring that U.S. sanctions do not limit the ability of civilians located in Syria to receive humanitarian support from the international community. For information related to the most relevant exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations for humanitarian assistance and trade under the Syria sanctions program and other sanctions programs, please refer to OFAC’s Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19. The Fact Sheet also outlines specific guidance for OFAC-administered sanctions programs related to personal protective equipment and other COVID-19-related humanitarian assistance and trade.

For more information regarding the scope of any sanctions programs’ requirements, including the Syria Sanctions Program or the Syria-related Sanctions Program, or the applicability or scope of any humanitarian-related authorizations, please contact OFAC’s Sanction Compliance and Evaluation Division at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490, or by email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property, and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Note: at this time, the link to the State Department action does not work. If it gets corrected, I will post it in a separate post.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Releases: Counter-Terrorism, Syria/Syria-related


State Department Statement on Syria designations

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Imposing Sanctions in Defense of Human Rights in Syria

The United States is taking action to promote accountability for entities and individuals that have perpetuated the suffering of the Syrian people.  The United States is sanctioning eight Syrian prisons, five Assad regime officials in the institutions that run those facilities, two militia groups, and two militia leaders.  These actions underscore the U.S. commitment to promote respect for human rights and accountability for abuse against Syrians.

Many of the prisons designated today were highlighted in the pictures provided by Caesar, a Syrian regime defector who worked as an official photographer for the Syrian military and exposed the regime’s ruthless and cruel treatment of detainees.  Today’s action furthers the goals of the Act named after him, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which seeks to promote accountability for the Assad regime’s abuses.

The Assad regime has detained and abused a vast number of Syrians since the start of the conflict, as has been well documented by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) and human rights groups.  More than 14,000 detainees have reportedly died after being tortured at the hands of the Assad regime, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, while 130,000 Syrians are reportedly still missing or detained.

  • The United States is imposing sanctions on Saydnaya Military Prison pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13894 for having engaged in the commission of serious human rights abuse, including torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and extrajudicial executions, since the start of the Syrian crisis. The United States is also designating seven additional prisons operated by the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate and Syrian Military Intelligence for being owned or controlled by entities blocked pursuant to E.O. 13572, and five regime officials in charge of Syrian prisons.
  • Additionally, the United States is imposing sanctions on Saraya al-Areen, a militia affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army that participated in the 2020 offensive operation to return Idlib to regime control. This operation contributed to the mass displacement of Syrian civilians and untold human suffering.  Nearly one million Syrians remain displaced from that operation and ongoing artillery attacks continue to harm civilians along the frontlines.
  • The United States is also imposing sanctions on armed Syrian opposition group Ahrar al-Sharqiya, for being responsible for serious human rights abuses, including abduction and torture, as well as on two of its leaders. Ahrar al-Sharqiya is reportedly involved in looting private property from civilians and barring displaced Syrians from returning to their homes.  The group has been implicated in the unlawful killing of Hevrin Khalaf, a Syrian Kurdish politician, in October 2019.  Ahrar al-Sharqiya has also integrated numerous former ISIS members into its ranks.  Both militias were designated today pursuant to E.O. 13894.

The world must renew its shared resolve to promote the dignity and human rights of all Syrians.  We urge the international community to join our calls for a nationwide ceasefire, the immediate release of those arbitrarily detained, and for information about the fate of the missing. The Assad regime must know that these steps are critical to any lasting peace or economic prosperity in Syria.

Even as we work to make sure our sanctions do not impede humanitarian aid delivery, early recovery or humanitarian resilience programs, or COVID 19 relief, today’s action makes clear that the United States will not forget the victims of human rights abuses in Syria and will use appropriate tools to target and single out those responsible, regardless of the perpetrator.

Link:

State Department Press Release

August 12, 2021: OFSI removes 1 from Syria sanctions

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Last Thursday, UK regulators removed:

AKHRAS, Tarif
DOB: 02/06/1951. POB: Homs, Syria Passport Details: 0000092405 (Syrian) Position: Founder of the Akhras Group, (commodities, trading, processing and logistics) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):SYR0230 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information):Chairman of the Homs Chamber of Commerce. Member of the Board of Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce. (UK Statement of Reasons):Prominent businessman benefiting from and supporting the regime. Founder of the Akhras Group (commodities, trading, processing and logistics) and former Chairman of the Homs Chamber of Commerce. Close business relations with President Al-Assad's family. Member of the Board of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce. Provided logistical support for the regime (buses and tank loaders). (Gender):Male Listed on: 05/09/2011 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 12/08/2021 Group ID: 12060.

from their Syrian sanctions program.

Link:

OFSI Notice

OFSI removes 5 from Syria sanctions

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UK regulators removed the following 5 persons:

1. AL ASSAD, NIZAR
a.k.a: (1) AL-ASAD (2) AL-ASSAAD, Nizar (3) AL-ASSAD, Nizar (4) ASAAD, Nizar (5) ASAD (6) ASSAAD, Nizar (7) ASSAD Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0193 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons): Prominent Syrian businessperson with close ties to the regime, including through Syrian President Al-Assad’s family. As such, has been participating in, benefitting from or otherwise supporting the Syrian regime. Associated with the Assad and Makhlouf families. (Gender): Male Listed on: 24/08/2011 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 30/09/2021 Group ID: 12041.

2. AL-QADRI, AHMAD
DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Hasakah, Al-Hasakah Province, Syria Nationality: Syrian Position: Former Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Minister Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0005 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons): Former Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Minister. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the regime's violent repression against the civilian population. (Gender): Male Listed on: 24/06/2014 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 30/09/2021 Group ID: 12986.

3. JAZBA, MOHAMMAD MAEN ZEIN-AL-ABADIN
DOB: --/--/1962. POB: Aleppo, Syria a.k.a: (1) JAZBA, Maen, Zein-Al-Abidin (2) JAZBA, Mohammad, Maen, Zein-Al-Abidin Nationality: Syrian Position: Former Minister of Industry Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0347 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information): Relatives/business associates or partners/links to listed individuals: Bashar Asad (UK Statement of Reasons): Former Ministry of Industry. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime's violent repression of the civilian population. (Gender): Male Listed on: 04/03/2019 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 30/09/2021 Group ID: 13777.

4. MAHMOUD, ALI HABIB
Title: General DOB: --/--/1939. POB: Tartous, Syria a.k.a: (1) HABIB, General, Ali (2) HABIB, Habeeb (3) MAHMOUD, General, Ali (4) MAHMOUD, Habeeb Position: Former Minister of Defence Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0074 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons): Former Minister of Defence. Associated with the Syrian regime and the Syrian military, and its violent repression against the civilian population. (Gender): Male Listed on: 02/08/2011 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 30/09/2021 Group ID: 12024.

5. TOHME, SALAM
Title: Dr a.k.a: (1) TAAME, Salam (2) TAAME, Salim (3) TA'MAH, Salam (4) TA'MAH, Salim (5) TOHMA, Salam (6) TOHMA, Salim (7) TOHME, Salim (8) TOUMAH, Salam (9) TOUMAH, Salim Address: Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), Barzeh Street, PO Box 4470, Damascus, Syria. Position: Deputy Director General, Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0214 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons): Deputy Director General of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) which is responsible for the development and production of non-conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. Due to senior position at SSRC, he is associated with designated entity SSRC. (Gender): Male Listed on: 19/03/2018 Last Updated: 12/07/2021 30/09/2021 Group ID: 13622.

from their Syria sanctions program.

Link:

OFSI Notice

OFAC has a new Syria FAQ for you…

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934. Are the United Nations and the U.S. government permitted to conduct stabilization and early recovery-related activities and transactions involving Syria?  Does this apply to their contractors and grantees as well?Answer

Yes.  The Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR) § 542.513 authorize, subject to certain conditions, the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, Programmes, Funds, and Related Organizations and their employees, contractors, or grantees to engage in all transactions and activities in support of their official business in Syria, including any stabilization and early recovery-related activities and transactions in support of their official business.  This authorization applies to all employees, grantees, and contractors carrying out the official business of the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, Programmes, Funds, and Related Organizations, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector entities that are acting as grantees or contractors.  Please be aware that grantees or contractors conducting activities and transactions authorized under § 542.513 must provide a copy of their contract or grant with the United Nations, or its specialized Agencies, Programmes, Funds, and Related Organizations to any U.S. person, including U.S. financial institutions processing funds transfers in support of the authorized activities, before the U.S. person engages in or facilitates any transaction or activity.

In addition, § 542.211(d) and the general license at § 542.522 exempt and authorize, respectively, subject to certain conditions, the Federal Government and its employees, grantees, or contractors to engage in all transactions in support of their official business in Syria, including any stabilization and early recovery-related activities and transactions in support of their official business.  This exemption and authorization apply to all employees, grantees, and contractors carrying out the official business of the Federal Government, including NGOs and private sector entities that are acting as grantees or contractors.  Please be aware that grantees or contractors conducting transactions authorized under § 542.522 must provide a copy of their grant or contract with the Federal Government to any U.S. person, including U.S. financial institutions processing funds transfers in support of the authorized activities, before the U.S. person engages in or facilitates any transaction.  

For NGOs that are not acting as grantees or contractors of the aforementioned international organizations or the Federal Government, please see § 542.516 for authorizations under the SySR related to the export or reexport of certain services to Syria in support of certain NGO activities.

Separately, non-U.S. persons, including NGOs, private sector entities, and foreign financial institutions facilitating or assisting in the aforementioned activities, do not risk exposure to U.S. secondary sanctions pursuant to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 for engaging in the above activities that are authorized or exempt for U.S. persons under the SySR.  Please see FAQ 884 for additional information.

Please note that this guidance does not apply to transactions and activities that may be subject to sanctions under other sanctions programs administered by OFAC (e.g., transactions with persons blocked under OFAC’s counterterrorism authority (E.O. 13224, as amended) or OFAC’s Syria-related authority (E.O. 13894)), unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC.

Links:

OFAC Notice

FAQ 934

EU adds 4 more persons to Syria sanctions

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Syria: four new ministers added to EU sanctions list

The Council today decided to add four recently-appointed ministers to the list of persons and entities subject to targeted EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria.

Today’s decision brings to 287 the number of persons targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. The list also includes 70 entities, which are subject to an asset freeze.

The sanctions currently in place against the Syrian regime were introduced in 2011, in response to the violent repression of the Syrian civilian population. They also target companies and prominent business people benefitting from their ties to the regime and the war economy. Restrictive measures also include a ban on the import of oil, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the Syrian central bank’s assets that are held in the EU, and export restrictions on equipment and technology that could be used for internal repression and on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.

The goal of the EU sanctions is to put pressure on the Syrian regime to halt repression and negotiate a lasting political settlement of the Syrian crisis in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. They are part and parcel of the EU’s wider approach to the Syria crisis. Sanctions on Syria remain under constant review.

The relevant legal acts, including the names of the persons and entities concerned, have been published in the Official Journal.

Links:

EU Notice

Official Journal of the European Union

OFAC tweaks the terrorist list, plus updates some Syrian listings

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Today. OFAC added the following persons:

AZAM, Sultan Aziz, Afghanistan; DOB 1985; POB Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

GHAFARI, Sanaullah (a.k.a. AL-MUHAJIR, Shahab), Afghanistan; DOB 28 Oct 1994; POB Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan; Gender Male; Passport O1503093 (individual) [SDGT].

KHALOZAI, Ismatullah (a.k.a. KHALOUZAI, Asmatullah; a.k.a. "KHEL, Sher Omar"), Kabul City, Kabul District, Kabul Province, Afghanistan; DOB 01 Jan 1995; POB Baba Zangi Village, Fabri Qand City, Baghlan-e Jadid District, Baghlan Province, Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISIL KHORASAN).

RAJAB, Maulawi (a.k.a. SALAHUDIN, Maulawi Rajab), Paghman District, Kabul Province, Afghanistan; DOB 1976; POB Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

removed the following persons:

HABBASH, George (a.k.a. HABASH, George); Secretary General of POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (individual) [SDGT].

HABASH, George (a.k.a. HABBASH, George); Secretary General of POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (individual) [SDGT].

SAI'ID, Shaykh (a.k.a. AHMAD, Mustafa Muhammad); POB Egypt (individual) [SDGT].

AHMAD, Mustafa Muhammad (a.k.a. SAI'ID, Shaykh); POB Egypt (individual) [SDGT].

AL-LIBI, Ibn Al-Shaykh (individual) [SDGT].

LADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad (a.k.a. AHMAD, Mufti Rasheed; a.k.a. LUDHIANVI, Mufti Rashid Ahmad; a.k.a. WADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad), Karachi, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

LUDHIANVI, Mufti Rashid Ahmad (a.k.a. AHMAD, Mufti Rasheed; a.k.a. LADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad; a.k.a. WADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad), Karachi, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

AHMAD, Mufti Rasheed (a.k.a. LADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad; a.k.a. LUDHIANVI, Mufti Rashid Ahmad; a.k.a. WADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad), Karachi, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

WADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad (a.k.a. AHMAD, Mufti Rasheed; a.k.a. LADEHYANOY, Mufti Rashid Ahmad; a.k.a. LUDHIANVI, Mufti Rashid Ahmad), Karachi, Pakistan (individual) [SDGT].

YULDASHEV, Tohir (a.k.a. YULDASHEV, Takhir), Uzbekistan (individual) [SDGT].

YULDASHEV, Takhir (a.k.a. YULDASHEV, Tohir), Uzbekistan (individual) [SDGT].

'AQIL, Ibrahim (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed (a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

"'ABD-AL-QADIR" (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

"TAHSIN" (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Sheikh (individual) [SDGT].

SHUKR, Fu'ad (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin; a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fouad Ali; a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaqs Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; DOB 15 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biaq' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Passport RL2418369 (Lebanon) (individual) [SDGT].

CHAKAR, Fu'ad (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin; a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fouad Ali; a.k.a. SHUKR, Fu'ad), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaqs Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; DOB 15 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biaq' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Passport RL2418369 (Lebanon) (individual) [SDGT].

CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fouad Ali; a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad; a.k.a. SHUKR, Fu'ad), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaqs Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; DOB 15 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biaq' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Passport RL2418369 (Lebanon) (individual) [SDGT].

CHAKAR, Fouad Ali (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin; a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad; a.k.a. SHUKR, Fu'ad), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaqs Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; DOB 15 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biaq' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Gender Male; Passport RL2418369 (Lebanon) (individual) [SDGT].

and updated the following persons (and 1 entity):

ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN (a.k.a. AL-SHANQITI, Khalid; a.k.a. AL-WALID, Mafouz Walad; a.k.a. AL-WALID, Mahfouz Ould); DOB 01 Jan 1975 (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AL-WALID, Mahfouz Ould (Arabic: محفوظ ولد الولید) (a.k.a. AL-SHANQITI, Khalid; a.k.a. AL-WALID, Mafouz Walad; a.k.a. "ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN"), Mauritania; DOB 01 Jan 1975; POB Mauritania; nationality Mauritania; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

ABU ZUBAYDAH (a.k.a. ABU ZUBAIDA; a.k.a. ABU ZUBEIDAH, Zeinulabideen Muhammed Husein; a.k.a. AL-WAHAB, Abd Al-Hadi; a.k.a. HUSAIN, Zain Al-Abidin Muhammad; a.k.a. HUSAYN, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad; a.k.a. HUSSEIN, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad; a.k.a. "TARIQ"); DOB 12 Mar 1971; POB Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; nationality Palestinian; Passport 484824 (Egypt) issued 18 Jan 1984 (individual) [SDGT]. -to- HUSAYN, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad (a.k.a. ABU ZUBEIDAH, Zeinulabideen Muhammed Husein; a.k.a. HUSAIN, Zain Al-Abidin Muhammad; a.k.a. HUSSEIN, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad; a.k.a. "ABU ZUBAIDA"; a.k.a. "ABU ZUBAYDAH"), Guantanamo Bay detention center, Cuba; DOB 12 Mar 1971; POB Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; nationality Palestinian; Gender Male; Passport 484824 (Egypt) issued 18 Jan 1984 (individual) [SDGT].

AFRIDI, Amanullah (a.k.a. GUL, Muhammad Aman; a.k.a. ULLAH, Aman; a.k.a. URS, Amanullah; a.k.a. "MUFTI ILYAS"), Frontier Region Kohat, Pakistan; DOB 1973; alt. DOB 1968; alt. DOB 1969; alt. DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971; alt. DOB 1972; alt. DOB 1974; alt. DOB 1975 (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AFRIDI, Amanullah (a.k.a. URS, Amanullah; a.k.a. "GUL, Muhammad Aman"; a.k.a. "MUFTI ILYAS"; a.k.a. "ULLAH, Aman"), Frontier Region Kohat, Pakistan; DOB 1973; alt. DOB 1968; alt. DOB 1969; alt. DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971; alt. DOB 1972; alt. DOB 1974; alt. DOB 1975; nationality Pakistan; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

AL-HAMATI, Muhammad (a.k.a. AL-AHDAL, Mohammad Hamdi Sadiq; a.k.a. AL-MAKKI, Abu Asim), Yemen (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AL-AHDAL, Mohammad Hamdi Mohammad Sadiq (Arabic: محمد حمدي محمد صادق الأھدل) (a.k.a. AL-AHDAL, Mohamed Mohamed Abdullah; a.k.a. AL-AHDAL, Muhammad Muhummad Abdullah; a.k.a. AL-HAMATI, Muhammad; a.k.a. "AL-MAKKI, Abu Asim"), Jamal street, Al-Dahima alley, Al-Hudaydah, Yemen; DOB 19 Nov 1971; POB Medina, Saudi Arabia; nationality Yemen; Gender Male; Passport 541939 (Yemen) issued 31 Jul 2000; National ID No. 216040 (Yemen) (individual) [SDGT].

AL-IRAQI, Abd al-Hadi (a.k.a. ABU ABDALLAH; a.k.a. AL-IRAQI, Abdal al-Hadi) (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AL-IRAQI, Abd al-Hadi (a.k.a. AL-IRAQI, Abdal al-Hadi), Guantanamo Bay detention center, Cuba; DOB 1961; POB Mosul, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

AL-SAYYID, 'Ali Sulayman Mas'ud 'Abd (a.k.a. AL-JAWZIYYAH, Ibn al-Qayyim; a.k.a. OSMAN, Mohamed; a.k.a. SAYED, Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul; a.k.a. "AL-QAYYIM, 'Ibn"; a.k.a. "AL-ZAWL"; a.k.a. "EL-QAIM, Ibn"); DOB 1969; POB Tripoli, Libya; Passport 96/184442 (Libya) (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AL-SAYYID, 'Ali Sulayman Mas'ud 'Abd (a.k.a. AL-JAWZIYYAH, Ibn al-Qayyim; a.k.a. SAYED, Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul; a.k.a. "AL-QAYYIM, 'Ibn"; a.k.a. "AL-ZAWL"; a.k.a. "EL-QAIM, Ibn"; a.k.a. "OSMAN, Mohamed"); DOB 1969; POB Tripoli, Libya; nationality Libya; Gender Male; Passport 96/184442 (Libya) (individual) [SDGT].

AL-ZUMAR, Abbud (a.k.a. ZUMAR, Colonel Abbud), Egypt; POB Egypt; Factional Leader of JIHAD GROUP (individual) [SDGT]. -to- AL-ZOMOR, Abboud Abdul Latif Hassan (Arabic: عبود عبداللطيف حسن الزمر) (a.k.a. AL-ZAMUR, Abboud Abdul Latif Hassan; a.k.a. AL-ZUMAR, Abbud; a.k.a. AL-ZUMUR, Abood Abdul Latif Hassan; a.k.a. EL-ZOMOR, Aboud Abdul Latif Hasan; a.k.a. ZUMAR, Abbud), Egypt; DOB 19 Apr 1947; POB Nahia, Giza, Egypt; nationality Egypt; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

AQIL, Ibrahim (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed); DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH). -to- AQIL, Ibrahim (a.k.a. AKIEL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. AKIL, Ibrahim Mohamed; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Abd al-Qadr; a.k.a. 'AQIL, Ibrahim; a.k.a. MEHDI, Ghosn Ali Abdel; a.k.a. "'ABD-AL-QADIR"; a.k.a. "TAHSIN"), Syria; Lebanon; DOB 24 Dec 1962; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1962; alt. DOB 20 Mar 1961; alt. DOB 1958; POB Bidnayil, Lebanon; alt. POB Younine, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH).

BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION (a.k.a. AL BIR AL DAWALIA; a.k.a. BIF-USA; a.k.a. MEZHDUNARODNYJ BLAGOTVORITEL'NYJ FOND; a.k.a. "BIF"), 8820 Mobile Avenue, 1A, Oak Lawn, IL 60453, United States; (Formerly located at) 20-24 Branford Place, Suite 705, Newark, NJ 07102, United States; (Formerly located at) 9838 S. Roberts Road, Suite 1-W, Palos Hills, IL 60465, United States; P.O. Box 548, Worth, IL 60482, United States; Bashir Safar Ugli 69, Baku, Azerbaijan; 69 Boshir Safaroglu St., Baku, Azerbaijan; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 3 King Street, South Waterloo, Ontario N2J 3Z6, Canada; P.O. Box 1508 Station B, Mississauga, Ontario L4Y 4G2, Canada; 2465 Cawthra Rd., #203, Mississauga, Ontario L5A 3P2, Canada; Ottawa, Canada; Grozny, Chechnya, Russia; 91 Paihonggou, Lanzhou, Gansu, China; Hrvatov 30, 41000, Zagreb, Croatia; Makhachkala, Daghestan, Russia; Duisi, Georgia; Tbilisi, Georgia; Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia; Burgemeester Kessensingel 40, Maastricht, Netherlands; House 111, First Floor, Street 64, F-10/3, Islamabad, Pakistan; Azovskaya 6, km. 3, off. 401, Moscow, Russia; P.O. Box 1055, Peshawar, Pakistan; Ulitsa Oktyabr'skaya, dom. 89, Moscow, Russia; P.O. Box 1937, Khartoum, Sudan; P.O. Box 7600, Jeddah 21472, Saudi Arabia; P.O. Box 10845, Riyadh 11442, Saudi Arabia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; United Kingdom; Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Gaza Strip, undetermined; Yemen; US FEIN 36-3823186 [SDGT]. -to- BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION (a.k.a. AL BIR AL DAWALIA; a.k.a. BIF-USA; a.k.a. MEZHDUNARODNYJ BLAGOTVORITEL'NYJ FOND; a.k.a. "BIF"), Bashir Safar Ugli 69, Baku, Azerbaijan; 69 Boshir Safaroglu St., Baku, Azerbaijan; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 3 King Street, South Waterloo, Ontario N2J 3Z6, Canada; P.O. Box 1508 Station B, Mississauga, Ontario L4Y 4G2, Canada; 2465 Cawthra Rd., #203, Mississauga, Ontario L5A 3P2, Canada; Ottawa, Canada; Grozny, Chechnya, Russia; 91 Paihonggou, Lanzhou, Gansu, China; Hrvatov 30, 41000, Zagreb, Croatia; Makhachkala, Daghestan, Russia; Duisi, Georgia; Tbilisi, Georgia; Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia; Burgemeester Kessensingel 40, Maastricht, Netherlands; House 111, First Floor, Street 64, F-10/3, Islamabad, Pakistan; Azovskaya 6, km. 3, off. 401, Moscow, Russia; P.O. Box 1055, Peshawar, Pakistan; Ulitsa Oktyabr'skaya, dom. 89, Moscow, Russia; P.O. Box 1937, Khartoum, Sudan; P.O. Box 7600, Jeddah 21472, Saudi Arabia; P.O. Box 10845, Riyadh 11442, Saudi Arabia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; United Kingdom; Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Gaza Strip, Palestinian; Yemen; IL, United States; US FEIN 36-3823186 [SDGT].

BINALSHIBH, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah (a.k.a. BIN AL SHIBH, Ramzi; a.k.a. BINALSHEIDAH, Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah; a.k.a. OMAR, Ramzi Mohammed Abdellah), Schleemer Ring 2, Hamburg 22117, Germany; Billstedter Hauptstr Apt. 14, Hamburg 22111, Germany; Emil Anderson Strasse 5, Hamburg 22073, Germany; Letzte Heller #109, Hamburg University, Hamburg 22111, Germany; Marienstr #54, Hamburg 21073, Germany; DOB 01 May 1972; alt. DOB 16 Sep 1973; POB Hadramawt, Yemen; alt. POB Khartoum Sudan; nationality Yemen; Passport R85243 (Yemen); alt. Passport A755350 (Saudi Arabia); alt. Passport 00085243 (Yemen) (individual) [SDGT]. -to- BINALSHIBH, Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah (a.k.a. BIN AL SHIBH, Ramzi; a.k.a. BINALSHEIDAH, Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah; a.k.a. OMAR, Ramzi Mohammed Abdellah), Guantanamo Bay detention center, Cuba; DOB 01 May 1972; alt. DOB 16 Sep 1973; POB Hadramawt, Yemen; alt. POB Khartoum Sudan; nationality Yemen; Gender Male; Passport R85243 (Yemen); alt. Passport A755350 (Saudi Arabia); alt. Passport 00085243 (Yemen) (individual) [SDGT].

INAYATULLAH (a.k.a. ENAYATULLAH, Maulawi; a.k.a. FATEHULLAH, Mullah; a.k.a. "Ghowya"), Pakistan; DOB 1972; POB Chahar Darah District, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan; Gender Male; Maulawi (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: TALIBAN). -to- INAYATULLAH, Maulawi (a.k.a. ENAYATULLAH, Maulawi; a.k.a. FATEHULLAH, Mullah; a.k.a. "Ghowya"), Pakistan; DOB 1972; POB Chahar Darah District, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan; nationality Afghanistan; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: TALIBAN).

ISAMUDDIN, Nurjaman Riduan (a.k.a. ISOMUDDIN, Riduan; a.k.a. NURJAMAN, Encep; a.k.a. "HAMBALI"; a.k.a. "NURJAMAN"); DOB 04 Apr 1964; alt. DOB 01 Apr 1964; POB Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia; nationality Indonesia (individual) [SDGT]. -to- ISAMUDDIN, Nurjaman Riduan (a.k.a. ISOMUDDIN, Riduan; a.k.a. NURJAMAN, Encep; a.k.a. "HAMBALI"; a.k.a. "NURJAMAN"), Guantanamo Bay detention center, Cuba; DOB 04 Apr 1964; alt. DOB 01 Apr 1964; POB Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia; nationality Indonesia; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN (a.k.a. JULKIPLI, Salim; a.k.a. KIPLI, Sali); DOB 20 Jun 1976; POB Tulay, Jolo Sulu, Philippines (individual) [SDGT]. -to- JULKIPLI, Salim Y Salamuddin (a.k.a. JULKIPLI, Salim; a.k.a. KIPLI, Sali), Philippines; DOB 20 Jun 1976; POB Tulay, Jolo Sulu, Philippines; nationality Philippines; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

MAYCHOU, Ali (a.k.a. AL MAGHREBI, Abderahmane; a.k.a. AL SANHAJI, Abu Abdul Rahman Ali; a.k.a. AL-SANHAJI, Abou Abderrahmane; a.k.a. AL-SANHAJI, Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman Ali; a.k.a. AL-SENHADJI, Abou Abderrahman), Mali; DOB 25 May 1983; POB Taza, Morocco; nationality Morocco; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT]. -to- MAYCHOU, Ali (a.k.a. AL SANHAJI, Abu Abdul Rahman Ali; a.k.a. AL-SANHAJI, Abou Abderrahmane; a.k.a. AL-SANHAJI, Abu 'Abd Al-Rahman Ali; a.k.a. AL-SENHADJI, Abou Abderrahman; a.k.a. "ABDERAHMANE AL MAGHREBI"), Mali; DOB 25 May 1983; POB Taza, Morocco; nationality Morocco; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem; a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah; a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith; a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul); DOB 14 Apr 1965; alt. DOB 01 Mar 1964; POB Kuwait; citizen Kuwait (individual) [SDGT]. -to- MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (), Guantanamo Bay detention center, Cuba; DOB 14 Apr 1965; alt. DOB 01 Mar 1964; POB Kuwait; citizen Kuwait; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

MOUSTFA, Djamel (a.k.a. KALED, Belkasam; a.k.a. "ALI BARKANI"; a.k.a. "MOUSTAFA"), c/o Birgit Melani Schroeder, Kuehlungsborner Strasse 30, Hamburg 22147, Germany; DOB 28 Sep 1973; alt. DOB 31 Dec 1979; alt. DOB 22 Aug 1973; POB Tiaret, Algeria; alt. POB Morocco; nationality Algeria; arrested 23 Apr 2002; currently in remand at 20355 Hamburg Holstenglacis 3, Germany (individual) [SDGT]. -to- MOUSTFA, Djamel (Arabic: جمال مصطفى) (a.k.a. KALAD, Belkasam; a.k.a. KALED, Belkasam; a.k.a. MOSTAFA, Damel; a.k.a. MOSTAFA, Djamal; a.k.a. MOSTEFA, Djamel; a.k.a. "ALI BARKANI"; a.k.a. "MOUSTAFA"), Algeria; DOB 28 Sep 1973; alt. DOB 31 Dec 1979; alt. DOB 22 Aug 1973; alt. DOB 25 Sep 1973; POB Mehdia, Tiaret, Algeria; alt. POB Morocco; nationality Algeria; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

SHUKR, Fu'ad (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad; a.k.a. "CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin"), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaws Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biqa' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH). -to- SHUKR, Fu'ad (a.k.a. CHAKAR, Fu'ad; a.k.a. CHAKAR,, Fouad Ali; a.k.a. "CHAKAR, Al-Hajj Mohsin"), Harat Hurayk, Lebanon; Ozai, Lebanon; Al-Firdaws Building, Al-'Arid Street, Haret Hreik, Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; DOB 15 Apr 1961; alt. DOB 1962; POB An Nabi Shit, Ba'labakk, Biqa' Valley, Lebanon; alt. POB Beirut, Lebanon; nationality Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Gender Male; Passport RL2418369 (Lebanon) (individual) [SDGT] [SYRIA] (Linked To: HIZBALLAH).

SULAIMAN, Mohammed Ibrahim, House Number 27, Block Number 29, Manishia District, Khartoum, Sudan; P.O. Box 3372, Khartoum, Sudan; Secretary General, IARA Headquarters (individual) [SDGT]. -to- SULAIMAN, Mohammed Ibrahim (a.k.a. SULEIMAN, Mohamed Ibrahim; a.k.a. SULIMAN, Mohammed Ibrahim), House Number 27, Block Number 29, Manishia District, Khartoum, Sudan; P.O. Box 3372, Khartoum, Sudan; DOB Aug 1946; nationality Sudan; Gender Male; Secretary General, IARA Headquarters (individual) [SDGT].

TALIB AND SONS PTY LTD, 21 Anthony Dr, 3149 Mt Waverly, Victoria, Australia; Company Number 633227488 (Australia) [SDGT] (Linked To: TALIB, Ahmed Luqman). -to- TALIB AND SONS PTY LTD, 21 Anthony Dr, Mt Waverly, Victoria 3149, Australia; Company Number 633227488 (Australia) [SDGT] (Linked To: TALIB, Ahmed Luqman).

TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY S.A.L. (a.k.a. TRUST LIFE; a.k.a. TRUST LIFE INSURANCE CO SAL), JTB Tower, Tahweeta High Way, Elias Hraoui Avenue, Beirut, Lebanon; Jamal Trust Vabk Building, Beirut, Lebanon; Beirut, Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations [SDGT] (Linked To: JAMMAL TRUST BANK S.A.L.). -to- TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY S.A.L. (a.k.a. TRUST LIFE; a.k.a. TRUST LIFE INSURANCE CO SAL), JTB Tower, Tahweeta High Way, Elias Hraoui Avenue, Beirut, Lebanon; Jamal Trust Bank Building, Beirut, Lebanon; Beirut, Lebanon; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions Pursuant to the Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations; Organization Established Date 16 Aug 2001; Registration Number 77138 (Lebanon) [SDGT] (Linked To: JAMMAL TRUST BANK S.A.L.).

YUSUF, Mohamed Mire Ali (a.k.a. ALI, Mohamed Mire; a.k.a. MIRE, Mohamed; a.k.a. MIRE, Mohamed Ali; a.k.a. MIRE, Muhammad), Puntland, Somalia; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 1975; alt. DOB 1974; alt. DOB 1976; nationality Somalia; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT). -to- YUSUF, Mohamed Mire Ali (a.k.a. ALI, Mohamed Mire; a.k.a. MIRE, Mohamed; a.k.a. MIRE, Mohamed Ali; a.k.a. MIRE, Muhammad), Puntland, Somalia; DOB 1975; alt. DOB 1974; alt. DOB 1976; nationality Somalia; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).

ZULKARNAEN (a.k.a. ARIF SUNARSO; a.k.a. ARIS SUMARSONO; a.k.a. ARIS SUNARSO; a.k.a. USTAD DAUD ZULKARNAEN; a.k.a. "MURSHID"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNAIN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNAN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNIN"); DOB 1963; POB Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia; nationality Indonesia (individual) [SDGT]. -to- SUMARSONO, Aris (a.k.a. SUNARSO, Arif; a.k.a. SUNARSO, Aris; a.k.a. "MURSHID"; a.k.a. "USTAD DAUD ZULKARNAEN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNAEN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNAIN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNAN"; a.k.a. "ZULKARNIN"), Jakarta, Indonesia; DOB 1963; POB Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia; nationality Indonesia; Gender Male (individual) [SDGT].

under the counter terrorism program (2 were also listed under the Syria program).

And Treasury issued the following press release:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Designates Key Financial Facilitator for the Islamic State’s Afghanistan Branch

November 22, 2021

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Ismatullah Khalozai, an individual who has acted as a financial facilitator for the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIL-Khorasan), active in Afghanistan and commonly referred to as “ISIS-K.” This individual has provided support to ISIS-K’s operations in Afghanistan by facilitating international financial transactions that fund human trafficking networks and facilitating the movement of foreign fighters who seek to escalate tensions in Afghanistan and the region.

“The Biden Administration is committed to rooting out terrorist financing networks around the world,” said Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control Andrea Gacki. “Today’s designation underscores the United States’ determination to prevent ISIS-K and its members from exploiting the international financial system to support terrorist acts in Afghanistan and beyond.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Treasury’s counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. ISIL-Khorasan was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Department of State pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in January 2016.

OFAC is taking this action in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, which today designated Sanaullah Ghafari, Sultan Aziz Azam, and Maulawi Rajab as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) for their roles as leaders of ISIS-K.

ISMATULLAH KHALOZAI

Ismatullah Khalozai has been an international financial facilitator for ISIS-K and has carried out missions for senior ISIS leadership. For a period of two years, Ismatullah Khalozai operated a Turkey-based hawala business to transfer funds to finance ISIS-K operations. Previously, he operated a United Arab Emirates-based financing scheme, which involved sending luxury items to international destinations for resale to generate funds in support of ISIS-K.

Ismatullah Khalozai has also carried out human smuggling operations for ISIS-K, including personally smuggling an ISIS-K courier from Afghanistan to Turkey.

Treasury designated Ismatullah Khalozai pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, ISIL-Khorasan.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individual named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individual designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United State of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that either knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

For information concerning the process for seeking removal from any OFAC list, including the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 . Additional information regarding sanctions programs administered by OFAC can be found here.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

OFAC updates two programs: amendments to Syria Sanctions Regulations & its FAQs – and updates Venezuela GL 8

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Publication of Amended Syria Sanctions Regulations and Related Frequently Asked Questions; Issuance of Venezuela-related General License 8I

Release date. 11/24/2021

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is adopting a final rule amending the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542, to expand an existing authorization related to certain activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Syria. This regulatory amendment is currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on Friday, November 26, 2021. OFAC is also publishing two, new Frequently Asked Questions (937 and 938).

Also, OFAC is issuing Venezuela-related General License 8I, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities.”

Here are the updated Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs):

937. What does the general license (GL) at § 542.516  of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), as amended on November 26, 2021, authorize with respect to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)?   Answer

The GL at § 542.516 of the SySR continues to authorize, subject to certain limitations, NGOs to engage in certain transactions and activities that would otherwise be prohibited in support of the following not-for-profit activities in Syria:

  • Humanitarian projects that meet basic human needs;
  • Democracy-building;
  • Education;
  • Non-commercial development projects directly benefitting the Syrian people; and
  • The preservation and protection of cultural heritage sites.

The transactions and activities that NGOs are authorized to engage in include:

  • Transactions with persons who meet the definition of the term Government of Syria, as defined in § 542.305(a) (i.e., the state and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Syria), that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.201(a)(1); 
  • New investment (i.e., a transaction that constitutes a commitment or contribution of funds or other assets, or a loan or other extension of credit) in Syria that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.206;
  • Exportation or reexportation of services that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.207; and
  • Purchase of refined petroleum products of Syrian origin for use in Syria that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.209.

Early-recovery-related transactions and activities that fall within the categories of transactions and activities listed above are authorized.  For transactions and activities not otherwise authorized or exempt from sanctions, OFAC considers license requests on a case-by-case basis.

Additionally, this GL authorizes U.S. financial institutions to process transfers of funds in support of the authorized transactions and activities outlined above.

Separately, non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign financial institutions, do not risk exposure to U.S. secondary sanctions pursuant to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 for engaging in or facilitating transactions and activities that are otherwise authorized or exempt for U.S. persons under the SySR.  Please see FAQ 884 for additional information.

Please note that this guidance does not apply to transactions and activities that may be subject to sanctions under other sanctions programs administered by OFAC (e.g., transactions with persons blocked under OFAC’s counterterrorism authority (E.O. 13224, as amended) or OFAC’s Syria-related authority (E.O. 13894)), unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC.

938. What early-recovery-related transactions and activities are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) authorized to engage in pursuant to the general license (GL) at § 542.516 of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), as amended on November 26, 2021?  Answer

The GL at § 542.516 of the SySR authorizes NGOs to engage in activities in support of certain not-for-profit activities in Syria, including:  humanitarian projects that meet basic human needs; democracy-building; education; non-commercial development projects directly benefitting the Syrian people; and the preservation and protection of cultural heritage sites.  This includes early-recovery-related transactions and activities by NGOs in support of transactions and activities that fall within the categories listed above, including:

  • the provision of healthcare and health-related services (such as the restoration of health facilities; the distribution of medical equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals; and technical training for and supervision of healthcare workers); 
  • the provision of educational support and training services (such as the rehabilitation of local schools, the provision of training and equipment support to local educators, training and equipment support to local officials on the operations and management of critical infrastructure, and the provision of vocational and business management training); 
  • the provision of agricultural-related services (such as the refurbishment of mills, silos, and bakeries to improve food security; the provision of veterinary health services and pharmaceuticals to promote the health of livestock; and training and distribution of agricultural related items); and
  • activities related to shelter and settlement assistance, and clean water assistance (such as the rehabilitation and restoration of conflict-damaged water systems, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure; supplying associated spare parts, training, and support for maintenance of equipment; and rehabilitation of irrigation pumps and canals). 

For transactions and activities not otherwise authorized or exempt from sanctions, OFAC considers license requests on a case-by-case basis. Individuals, NGOs, companies, or financial institutions with questions about engaging in or processing transactions or activities related to this authorization can contact OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance and Evaluation Division most efficiently via email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov. Sanctions Compliance and Evaluation may also be reached via phone at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490.

And the new version of GL8 extends the expiration date of the authorization until June 1, 2022.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Syrian Sanctions Regulations Final Rule

General License 8I

Updated FAQs – 937, 938


SECO adds 4, updates a bunch under Syria sanctions

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News

25 November 2021 International sanction 2021

Updated sanctions report

The Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER has amended Annex 7 to the Regulation of 8. June 2012 on measures against Syria (RS 946.231.172.7) published.

On the 24th On November 11, 2021, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER amended the list of persons, companies and organizations sanctioned in this context. The change is directly applicable in Switzerland. The WBF has therefore adapted the sanctions database SESAM (SECO Sanctions Management), which is relevant for Switzerland, and published the adaptation on its website. The change will take effect on the 25th. November 2021 at 6 p.m.

Financial intermediaries are invited to block the corresponding assets immediately and to report such business relationships to SECO in accordance with the provisions of the regulation. The notification to SECO does not exempt a financial intermediary from immediately reporting to the Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Office in accordance with Article 9 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act if conditions are met.

Swiss authorities added the following persons:

SSID: 200-46538 Name: Amr Salem
Sex: M DOB: Jan 1958 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection. Appointed in Aug 2021. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 25 Nov 2021
SSID: 200-46545 Name: Boutros Al-Hallaq
Sex: M POB: Damascus Countryside, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Minister of information. Appointed in Aug 2021. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 25 Nov 2021
SSID: 200-46551 Name: Mohammad Seifeddine
Sex: M Good quality a.k.a.: Seif Eddin (Seif El Din)
Justification: Minister of Labour and social affairs. Appointed in Aug 2021. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 25 Nov 2021
SSID: 200-46557 Name: Diala Barakat
Sex: W DOB: 1980
Justification: Minister of State. Appointed in Aug 2021. As a Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 25 Nov 2021

to their Syria sanctions program, and updated the following existing individual listings:

SSID: 200-22419 Name: Jassem Mohammad Zakaria
Sex: M Title: Dr. DOB: 1968 Good quality a.k.a.: a) Jasem b) Mohamed (Muhammad, Mohammed)
Justification: Former Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Amended on 6 Nov 2013, 23 Jun 2014, 19 Jan 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 25 Nov 2021

SSID: 200-29895 Name: Ghassan Ahmed Ghannam
Sex: M Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ahmad b) Ghannan (Ghanem) c) Brigadier General (Major General) d) Major General
Justification: Member of the Syrian Armed Forces of the rank of Colonel and the equivalent or higher in post after May 2011. Major General and Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade. Associated with Maher al-Assad through his role in the 155th Missile Brigade. As Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade, he is supporting the Syrian regime and he is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population. Responsible for firing scud missiles at various civilian sites between Jan and Mar 2013. Relation: Related to Maher Al- Assad (SSID 200-11625) Other information: a) Position: Commander of the 155th Missile Brigade b) Rank: Major General Modifications: Listed on 17 Dec 2014, amended on 11 Oct 2016, 26 Jun 2020, 11 Jun 2021, 25 Nov 2021

SSID: 200-35718 Name: Abdullah Abdullah
Sex: M DOB: 1956
Justification: Former State MinisterMinister of State. Appointed in Aug 2021. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 9 Dec 2016, amended on 16 Jun 2017, 13 Aug 2019, 26 Jun 2020, 30 Oct 2020, 25 Nov 2021

SSID: 200-38320 Name: Imad Abdullah Sara
Sex: M DOB: 1968 POB: Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: Former Minister of Information. Appointed in Jan 20182018. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 7 Mar 2018, amended on 26 Jun 2020, 25 Nov 2021

SSID: 200-43776 Name: Talal Al-Barazi
Sex: M DOB: 1963 POB: Hama, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: Barazi Justification: Former Minister of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection. Appointed in May 2020. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression of the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 30 Oct 2020, amended on 25 Nov 2021

SSID: 200-43910 Name: Malloul Hussein
Sex: M DOB: 1950 POB: Al-Hasakah Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Maloul b) Al-Hussein
Justification: Former Minister of State. Appointed in Aug 2020. As a former Government Minister, shares responsibility for the Syrian regime’s violent repression against the civilian population. Modifications: Listed on 19 Nov 2020, amended on 25 Nov 2021

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

I knew I forgot something before the holiday… Treasury’s press release about the expanded Syrian General License

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PRESS RELEASES

U.S. Treasury Expands Syria Nongovernmental Organizations General License 

November 24, 2021

Amends Syria Sanctions Regulations and Issues Two New FAQs

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR) to expand the authorizations for nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to engage in certain transactions and activities.  This action — which builds upon the U.S. government’s longstanding humanitarian exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations in the Syria sanctions program — helps ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, including certain early-recovery activities, that benefit the Syrian people.  Treasury’s recent sanctions review highlighted the need for continued review of existing authorities to facilitate legitimate humanitarian activity while continuing to deny support to malicious actors.

As part of this commitment, OFAC amended the NGO general license (GL) at § 542.516of the SySR.  The amended GL authorizes NGOs to engage in the following additional transactions and activities in support of certain not-for-profit activities in Syria:  new investment in Syria; the purchase of refined petroleum products of Syrian origin for use in Syria; and certain transactions with elements of the Government of Syria.  These new transactions and activities are authorized only in support of the not-for-profit activities already authorized under the GL, including humanitarian projects that meet basic human needs, democracy-building, projects supporting education, non-commercial development projects directly benefitting the Syrian people, and activities to support the preservation and protection of cultural heritage sites.  

Additionally, the NGO GL authorizes U.S. financial institutions to process transfers of funds in support of the authorized transactions and activities outlined above.  This amendment will take effect on November 26, 2021.  For more information on what the NGO GL at § 542.516 authorizes, as well as guidance for non-U.S. persons engaging in or facilitating transactions and activities authorized for U.S. persons under the amended GL, please refer to FAQ 937.  Additional information on early recovery transactions and activities authorized pursuant to the amended NGO GL can be found in FAQ 938.

“The U.S. government prioritizes expanding humanitarian access throughout Syria to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, who continue to face armed conflict, food insecurity, and the COVID-19 pandemic.  The U.S. remains committed to ensuring that humanitarian assistance from the international community, including early-recovery-related humanitarian activities, reaches Syrian civilians,” said OFAC Director Andrea M. Gacki.  “The United States continues to focus on deterring the malign activities of Bashar al-Assad, his regime, cronies, and foreign enablers, as well as terrorist groups, including by limiting their ability to access the international financial system and global supply chains.”

OFAC encourages those interested in providing humanitarian assistance to Syria to avail themselves of the longstanding exemptions and authorizations pertaining to humanitarian assistance, as further described in FAQs 884885, and 934.  For a summary of the most relevant exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations for humanitarian assistance under the Syria sanctions programs, please refer to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s COVID-19-related Fact Sheet.  Should individuals, governments, or entities have sanctions-related questions about the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syria, or believe additional authorizations are needed, OFAC stands ready to provide guidance and respond to applications for specific licenses.

For transactions not otherwise authorized or exempt from sanctions, OFAC considers license requests on a case-by-case basis and prioritizes applications, compliance questions, and other requests related to humanitarian support. If you have additional questions regarding the scope of any sanctions programs’ requirements, or the applicability or scope of any humanitarian-related authorizations, please contact OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance and Evaluation Division at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490, or by email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov.

Note: Notice that Wednesday’s OFAC release included an updated Venezuela General License, not a Syria one. That’s because the exemptions of the “general license” are housed in the updated Syrian Sanctions Regulations, not in a standalone General License document. It’s a good thing to note: from time to time, GLs may get pulled into the regulatory text, and disappear as separate documents. To fully understand the available exemptions, you need to bone up on both.

Link:

Treasury Press Release

Today at OFAC: Global Magnitsky, Iran (including CAATSA-Iran), Syria

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Today, OFAC designated the following people:

AZAMI, Seyed Reza Mousavi (Arabic: سید رضا موسوی اعظمی), Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: SPECIAL UNITS OF IRAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES). 

EBRAHIMI, Mohsen (Arabic: محسن ابراهیمی), Iran; DOB 1961; alt. DOB 1962; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; National ID No. 48107174 (Iran) (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: IRAN'S COUNTER-TERROR SPECIAL FORCES).

HEMMATIAN, Ali (Arabic: علی همتیان) (a.k.a. AMINIAN, Ali; a.k.a. "Raouf"), Iran; DOB 1982; alt. DOB 1983; POB Damghan, Semnan Province, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR].

KARAMI, Hassan (Arabic: حسن کرمی), Iran; DOB 1960; POB Urmia, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: SPECIAL UNITS OF IRAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES).

KARAMI, Mohammad (Arabic: محمد کرمی), Sistan and Baluchistan, Iran; DOB 27 Jan 1966; POB Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male; Passport K50849392 (Iran) expires 23 Sep 2024 (individual) [CAATSA - IRAN].

KHODADADI, Soghra (Arabic: صغری خدادادی) (a.k.a. TAGHANAKE, Soghra Khodadadi; a.k.a. TAGHANAKI, Soghra Khodadadi), Varamin, Tehran, Iran; DOB 27 Mar 1971; POB Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Female; Passport B50799950 (Iran) (individual) [CAATSA - IRAN].

SAFDARI, Masoud (Arabic: مسعود صفدری) (a.k.a. SAFDARI, Massoud; a.k.a. "Sattar"), Shahrak Shahid Mahallati District, Tehran, Iran; DOB 1983; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR].

VASEGHI, Leila (Arabic: ليلا واثقی) (a.k.a. VASEGHI, Layla; a.k.a. VASEGHI, Leyla; a.k.a. VASEQI, Layla), Iran; DOB 1973; alt. DOB 1972; POB Sari, Mazandaran Province, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Female (individual) [IRAN-HR].

and entities:

IRAN'S COUNTER-TERROR SPECIAL FORCES (a.k.a. IRANIAN SPECIAL POLICE FORCES; a.k.a. NIROO-YE VIZHE PASDAR-E VELAYAT; a.k.a. SUPREME LEADER'S GUARDIAN SPECIAL FORCES; a.k.a. "NOPO" (Arabic: "نوپو"); a.k.a. "PROVINCIAL SPECIAL FORCES"; a.k.a. "SPECIAL COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE"), Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Target Type Government Entity [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: SPECIAL UNITS OF IRAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES). 

ISFAHAN CENTRAL PRISON (Arabic: زندان مرکزی اصفهان) (a.k.a. DASTGERD PRISON; a.k.a. ESFAHAN PRISON), Isfahan City, Isfahan Province, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [CAATSA - IRAN].

SPECIAL UNITS OF IRAN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES (a.k.a. IRANIAN POLICE SPECIAL UNITS; a.k.a. LEF SPECIAL UNITS; a.k.a. NAJA SPECIAL UNITS; a.k.a. YEGAN-E VIZHE (Arabic: یگان ویژه ناجا); a.k.a. "YEGOP"), Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Target Type Government Entity [IRAN-HR] (Linked To: LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN).

ZAHEDAN PRISON (Arabic: زندان زاهدان), Zahedan - the end of Moallem Boulevard, in front of Moallem 33, Sistan and Baluchistan, Iran; Zahedan, Daneshjoo Blvd, Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions [CAATSA - IRAN].

under various Iran-related authorities, the following people:

AL-HASOURI, Muhammad Yousef (Arabic: محمد یوسف الحاصوري) (a.k.a. HASOURI, Mohammad Yousef (Arabic: محمد یوسف حاصوري); a.k.a. HASOURI, Muhammad Yousef; a.k.a. HASOURI, Muhammed Yousef), Syria; DOB 1965; POB Talkalakh, Homs, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Major General (individual) [SYRIA]. 

AL-HASSAN, Kamal (a.k.a. HASAN, Kamal 'Ali (Arabic: کمال علي حسن)), Damascus, Syria; DOB 10 Jun 1967; nationality Syria; Gender Male; National ID No. 571778 (Syria); Brigadier General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE).

KHADOUR, Tawfiq Muhammad (Arabic: توفیق محمد خضور) (a.k.a. KHADUR, Tawfiq Ahmad), Syria; DOB 1966; POB Hilat Ara, Jablah, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Major General (individual) [SYRIA].

KHALIL, Qahtan (Arabic: قحطان خلیل), Syria; DOB 1964; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Major General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE).

SALAMEH, Adeeb Namer (Arabic: أديب نمر سلامة) (a.k.a. SALAMAH, Adib Nimr; a.k.a. SALAMEH, Adib), Damascus, Syria; DOB 26 Nov 1953; POB Dahr Al-Maghar, al-Salamiyeh, Hamah, Syria; nationality Syria; Gender Male; Passport 578761 (Syria); Major General (individual) [SYRIA] (Linked To: SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE).

under its Syria sanctions program, and the following person:

KANDIHO, Abel, Uganda; DOB 11 Jun 1970; POB Mbarara, Uganda; nationality Uganda; Gender Male; Passport DA025622 (Uganda) expires 29 Mar 2027 (individual) [GLOMAG].  
SOLEIMANI, Gholamreza (a.k.a. SOLEIMANI, Gholam Reza; a.k.a. SOLEYMANI, Gholam Reza), Iran; DOB 1964; alt. DOB 1965; POB Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRAN-EO13876]. -to- SOLEIMANI, Gholamreza (Arabic: غلامرضا سلیمانی) (a.k.a. SOLEIMANI, Gholam Reza; a.k.a. SOLEIMANY, Gholamreza; a.k.a. SOLEYMANI, Gholam Reza), Iran; DOB 1964; alt. DOB 1965; POB Farsan, Iran; nationality Iran; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Gender Male (individual) [IRGC] [IRAN-HR] [IRAN-EO13876] (Linked To: BASIJ RESISTANCE FORCE).  

under its Global Magnitsky anti-corruption/human rights sanctions. Also, the following existing Iran-related designation was updated:

And Treasury:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Targets Repression and the Undermining of Democracy

December 7, 2021

Designations Across Three Countries Latest in Week of Actions Leading to Summit for Democracy

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating 15 actors across three countries in connection with serious human rights abuse and repressive acts targeting innocent civilians, political opponents, and peaceful protestors. As part of a whole-of-government commitment to democracy, Treasury is taking a number of actions aimed at promoting accountability for those who undermine trust in democratic institutions. Treasury is equipped with powerful tools to target the financial systems and flows that allow bad actors to profit from corruption and abuse. In addition, OFAC is designating two entities and two individuals that the Department of State has identified as responsible for certain gross violations of human rights in Iran.

“Ahead of this week’s Summit for Democracy, Treasury is targeting over a dozen government officials across three countries in connection with serious human rights abuse that undermines democracy,” said Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control Andrea M. Gacki. “Treasury will continue to defend against authoritarianism, promoting accountability for violent repression of people seeking to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Today’s actions are taken pursuant to the following authorities: Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, and targets perpetrators of corruption and serious human rights abuse; E.O. 13553, which imposes sanctions on certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran; Section 106 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which allows Treasury to designate persons listed by the Secretary of State as responsible for gross violations of human rights against individuals in Iran who seek to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of the Government of Iran, or to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms; as well as E.O. 13572, which, among other things, imposes sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses in Syria, as well as senior officials of, or entities owned or controlled by, persons blocked pursuant to E.O. 13572.

REPRESSION AND THE UNDERMINING OF DEMOCRACY

Democratic values and human rights are under threat around the world. Human rights defenders, members of civil society groups, journalists, and ordinary people seeking to exercise their right to freedom of expression and right of peaceful assembly face threats of violent repression from authoritarian leaders. Allowing this activity to continue unchallenged not only abandons and threatens victims of human rights abuses, but also poses a direct threat to the national security of the United States. Countries with repressive political regimes are often unstable over the long run, and they export instability regionally and worldwide. These regimes are often a threat to the peace and security of other nations. Standing up for human rights is not only consistent with American values but also U.S. national interests.

REPRESSION IN UGANDA: ABEL KANDIHO

As commander of the Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), Major General Abel Kandiho (Kandiho) and other CMI officers have arrested, detained, and physically abused persons in Uganda. The CMI targeted individuals due to their nationality, political views, or critique of the Ugandan government. Individuals were taken into custody and held, often without legal proceedings, at CMI detention facilities where they were subjected to horrific beatings and other egregious acts by CMI officials, including sexual abuse and electrocutions, often resulting in significant long-term injury and even death. During these incarcerations, victims were kept in solitary confinement and unable to contact friends, family, or legal support. In some cases, Kandiho was personally involved, leading interrogations of detained individuals.

Kandiho is designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to his tenure.

REPRESSION IN IRAN: VIOLENT SUPPRESSION OF PEACEFUL PROTESTERS AND PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE 

The Special Units of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF Special Units) are the dedicated crowd control and protest suppression unit of Iran’s LEF, one of the Government of Iran’s main security apparatuses that played a key role in the crackdown on protesters in the aftermath of the disputed Iranian presidential election in 2009. Serious human rights abuses against prisoners detained in the post-election protests also occurred at a detention facility run by the LEF. Treasury designated the LEF pursuant to E.O. 13553 on June 9, 2011, for its role in the post-election crackdown. The LEF Special Units were also involved in the post-election protest suppression in 2009 and have been called upon to forcefully put down multiple nationwide protests since then, including the November 2019 protests resulting from gasoline price increases, during which Iranian security forces killed hundreds of Iranian protestors. The LEF Special Units were one of the main security forces on the ground in November 2019, alongside units of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Basij Resistance Force (Basij), a paramilitary force subordinate to the IRGC. In multiple locations throughout Iran, LEF Special Units forces, along with those of a subunit, Iran’s Counter-Terror Special Forces (NOPO), used excessive and lethal force, firing upon unarmed protestors, including women and children, with automatic weapons. NOPO forces blocked main streets with armed vehicles and fired randomly at crowds with heavy machine guns.

The LEF Special Units and NOPO are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being persons acting on behalf of the Government of Iran responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. The LEF Special Units are also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces. NOPO is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the LEF Special Units

Hassan Karami (Karami) is the commander of the LEF Special Units and has overseen the unit during periods of nationwide unrest during which the LEF Special Units have employed excessive and lethal force against Iranian unarmed protestors, including during November 2019. He was sanctioned by the European Union in April 2021 for his role in the violent response to the November 2019 protests. Mohsen Ebrahimi (Ebrahimi) was appointed commander of NOPO in 2016 and has similarly overseen the unit during several subsequent periods of nationwide unrest during which NOPO employed excessive and lethal force against Iranian unarmed protestors. Seyed Reza Mousavi Azami (Azami) commands a brigade of the LEF Special Units.  

Karami and Azami are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the LEF Special UnitsEbrahimi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NOPO.

Gholamreza Soleimani (Soleimani) commands the Basij, one of Iran’s most important domestic security resources. The Basij has been heavily involved in violent crackdowns in Iran, including following the June 2009 contested presidential election, and in November 2019, during Soleimani’s tenure, when the Basij reportedly were among the Iranian security organizations that collectively killed hundreds of Iranian men, women, and children. Treasury designated the Basij pursuant to E.O. 13553 on June 9, 2011, for, among other activity, its role in the 2009 post-election crackdown. Soleimani was sanctioned by the European Union in April 2021 for his role in the violent response to the November 2019 protests.

Soleimani is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Basij.

Leila Vaseghi (Vaseghi), the governor of Qods city, was responsible for issuing an order to the police and other armed forces during the November 2019 protests to shoot unarmed protestors, causing dozens of deaths or injuries. Vaseghi was also sanctioned by the EU in April 2021 for her role in the violent response to the November 2019 protests.

Vaseghi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being a person acting on behalf of the Government of Iran (including members of paramilitary organizations) who is responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran.

IRGC interrogators Ali Hemmatian (Hemmatian) and Masoud Safdari (Safdari) have long records of physical abuse against Iranian political prisoners at IRGC detention facilities, including at Iran’s Evin Prison. Hemmatian employed physical beatings and whippings during interrogation of prisoners, resulting in lasting damage, including cracked bones. He has physically beaten many student activists and women, and has also directed, and authored the text of, televised confessions. Safdari has similarly been involved in detainee abuse, to include physical beatings and threatening the families of detainees. He has also managed the recording of televised confessions.

Hemmatian and Safdari are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being persons acting on behalf of the Government of Iran (including members of paramilitary organizations) responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. On March 9, 2021 the Department of State designated Hemmatian and Safdari pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021, for their involvement in gross violations of human rights.

Zahedan Prison, located in the Sistan and Baluchistan province in southeast Iran, reportedly holds several political prisoners who belong to the Baluch ethnic minority group. According to public reports, on January 3, 2021, Baluch prisoner Hassan Dehvari was executed in Zahedan Prison. Dehvari was sentenced to death for “armed rebellion against the Islamic Rule.” His sentence was escalated to execution after he engaged in several acts of peaceful protests, such as signing statements condemning executions of Sunni prisoners and condemning the mistreatment of fellow prisoners in Zahedan Prison. Dehvari addressed an open letter to UN experts protesting his death sentence and requesting help. According to Dehvari’s lawyer, his execution was carried out despite a request for retrial pending with the Supreme Court. Dehvari’s execution was likely in retaliation for seeking to exercise his right to freedom of expression. According to human rights groups, IRGC officers arrested another Baluch prisoner, Hamid Reza Koukhan, on August 27, 2020 for reportedly “writing slogans, disrupting national security, and insulting the leadership of Qassem Soleimani” during a protest and sent him to Zahedan Prison in October 2020. Zahedan Prison is responsible for the flagrant denial of the right to liberty of Koukhan for seeking to exercise his right to freedom of expression and his right of peaceful assembly.

Isfahan Central Prison, also known as “Dastgerd Prison,” located in Isfahan city, is where, according to media reports, Mostafa Salehi, an electrical generator repairman, was executed on August 5, 2020 after taking part in streets protests in December 2017 and January 2018. According to Human Rights Watch, the prosecutor in Salehi’s case accused him of having contacts with foreign intelligence and having “organized the riots.” Salehi was convicted of murder for the killing of an IRGC officer during these protests but maintained his innocence and independent media reports suggest that the prosecution authorities failed to provide evidence of his guilt. Isfahan Central Prison is responsible for the flagrant denial of the right to life and liberty of Salehi for seeking to exercise his right to freedom of expression and his right of peaceful assembly.

Zahedan Prison and Isfahan Central Prison are being listed by the Department of State and designated by OFACpursuant to Section 106 of CAATSA.

Soghra Khodadadi, the current director of Qarchak Women’s Prison, was responsible for ordering and directly participating in a violent attack on December 13, 2020 against prisoners of conscience in Ward 8 along with at least 20 other guards. According to publicly available reports, prison guards beat these female prisoners of conscience with batons and stun guns. Khodadadi ordered this attack in retaliation for the prisoners exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Khodadadi is being listed by the Department of State and designated by OFAC pursuant to Section 106 of CAATSA. Qarchak Prison was publicly identified as responsible for certain gross violations of human rights under CAATSA in 2019 and designated in 2020.

Mohammad Karami is a Brigadier General and commands the IRGC South-East Quds Operational Base in Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The Quds Base is officially tasked with ensuring security in Sistan-Baluchistan, including the Saravan border, between Sistan and Baluchistan and Pakistan. According to public reporting, Karami is responsible for the actions of IRGC officers stationed at the Shamsar Base, who according to Amnesty International on February 22, 2021 fired live ammunition at unarmed fuel porters who were seeking to exercise their freedom of expression.

Karami is being listed by the Department of State and designated by OFACpursuant to Section 106 of CAATSA.

REPRESSION IN SYRIA: DESIGNATIONS OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN DEADLY CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS, AND DESIGNATIONS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ENTITIES 

OFAC is also designating two senior Syrian Air Force officers responsible for chemical weapons attacks on civilians and three senior officers in Syria’s repressive security and intelligence apparatus. These senior officials and the organizations they are associated with have imprisoned hundreds of thousands of Syrians who peacefully called for change. Moreover, at least 14,000 prisoners in Syria have allegedly died as a result of torture. Today’s designations are another critical step in promoting accountability for the Assad regime’s abuses against Syrians.

Tawfiq Muhammad Khadour (Khadour) is a Major General in the Syrian Air Force (SAF), currently in command of the 22nd Air Division. On February 25, 2018, while Khadour commanded the 30th Brigade of the SAF at Dumayr Airbase, airstrikes from the airbase against Eastern Ghouta dropped chemical barrel bombs throughout the area, killing civilians. On April 7, 2018, an attack on Eastern Ghouta launched from Dumayr Airbase, still under the command of Khadour, included at least two chlorine barrel bombs and a guided missile attack on a humanitarian facility, rendering it inoperable and killing dozens of civilians.

Khadour is being designated under E.O. 13572 for being responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or having participated in, the commission of human rights abuses in Syria, including those related to repression.

Muhammad Youssef Al-Hasouri (Al-Hasouri) is a Major General in the SAF in command of the 70th Brigade at T-4 Military Airbase. Al-Hasouri previously served as the deputy commander of the 50th Brigade of the Syrian Air Force at al-Shayrat Airbase. Al-Hasouri personally carried out numerous airstrikes killing Syrian civilians, including chemical weapons attacks. This includes the notorious April 4, 2017 sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun, which killed at least 87 people and for which the European Union sanctioned him.

Al-Hasouri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13572 for being responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or having participated in, the commission of human rights abuses in Syria, including those related to repression.

Adeeb Namer Salameh (Salameh) is the Assistant Director of Syrian Air Force Intelligence (SAFI), an integral component of the Assad regime’s repressive security apparatus. Treasury previously designated SAFI on May 18, 2011, for its role in the Assad regime’s violent response to civil society protests, including the use of live ammunition against protesters by SAFI forces. Salameh was previously head of SAFI’s Aleppo Branch, wherein he was described as one of the most extreme officers and prominent symbols of the Syrian regime’s crimes. Salameh was the first to transform a “Shabiha,” a term for local criminal gangs, into an irregular militia force under regime control. The militia that Salameh commanded was reportedly responsible for torture, killings, and kidnapping for ransom in the countryside surrounding Salamiyeh, Syria. Salameh gained the nickname “Aleppo’s president” after imposing his influence on all the security branches, authorities, and merchants of Aleppo. Salameh has been implicated in major corruption cases for having received large sums of money in exchange for protecting factories and appointing himself as a partner to major investors in Aleppo.

Salameh is being designated for being a senior official of SAFI, an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13572.

Qahtan Khalil (Khalil) is a senior SAFI official and is the head of the Security Committee in the South of Syria. He is one of the SAFI officers accused of direct responsibility for the notorious Daraya massacre, which left hundreds dead in the suburbs of Damascus in 2012.

Khalil is being designated for being a senior official of SAFI, an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13572.

Kamal al-Hassan (al-Hassan) is the commander of SMI Branch 227 and previously commanded SMI Branch 235, the SMI branch responsible for joint operations with Hizballah. Branch 227 was one of the SMI branches specifically highlighted in images provided by Caesar, a Syrian regime defector — in whose name the Caesar Act was passed into law — who worked as an official forensic photographer for the Syrian military and who courageously revealed thousands of images of detainees who were reportedly tortured and killed.

Al-Hassan is being designated for being a senior official of SMI, an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13572.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the persons designated above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more, by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

GLOBAL MAGNITSKY

Building upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, E.O. 13818 was issued on December 20, 2017, in recognition that the prevalence of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, had reached such scope and gravity as to threaten the stability of international political and economic systems. Human rights abuse and corruption undermine the values that form an essential foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies; have devastating impacts on individuals; weaken democratic institutions; degrade the rule of law; perpetuate violent conflicts; facilitate the activities of dangerous persons; and undermine economic markets. The United States seeks to impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons.

and State:

Targeting Repression and Supporting Democracy

PRESS STATEMENT

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

DECEMBER 7, 2021Share

Consistent with the goals of this week’s Summit for Democracy, the United States is committed to using its full range of tools to counter serious human rights abuse and repressive acts across the world.  That is why today we designated multiple actors across three countries in connection with serious human rights abuse and repressive acts targeting political opponents, peaceful protestors, and other individuals pursuant to Executive Orders (E.O.) 13818, 13553, and 13572.  The United States also submitted a report, pursuant to section 106 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), identifying persons who are responsible for certain gross violations of human rights in Iran.

The Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the State Department, targeted military actors in connection with serious human rights abuse.  These actors include the commander of the Ugandan Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, two Syrian Air Force officers responsible for chemical weapons attacks on civilians, and three Syrian intelligence officers in Syria’s repressive security and intelligence apparatus.  These designations, which include individuals previously sanctioned by the European Union, also bring the United States into closer alignment with allies and partners, reflecting our shared commitment to promoting democracy and respect for human rights.

Additionally, Treasury sanctioned seven Iranian individuals and two Iranian law enforcement entities in connection with serious human rights abuse pursuant to E.O. 13553.  Further, pursuant to Section 106 of CAATSA, the Department of State identified two entities and two individuals who are responsible for certain gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Iran.  This action under CAATSA included two prisons, the Zahedan Prison and Isfahan Central Prison, which are responsible for extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detention.

The United States is committed to promoting democracy and accountability for those who abuse human rights around the world. The United States will utilize its full range of tools to highlight and disrupt these abuses of human rights. We will continue to stand in solidarity with the people of these countries and others where abuses and violations of human rights continue to occur.

issued press releases.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases: State, Treasury

EU sanctions the Wagner Group under human rights sanctions, and 3 country-based programs

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  • Council of the EU
  • Press release
  • 13 December 2021
  • 15:15

EU imposes restrictive measures against the Wagner Group

The Council today adopted a set of restrictive measures against the Wagner Group, a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity. The measures target the Wagner group itself, and eight individuals and three entities connected to it.

The Wagner Group has recruited, trained and sent private military operatives to conflict zones around the world to fuel violenceloot natural resources and intimidate civilians in violation of international law, including international human rights law.

The individuals listed by the EU are involved in serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, or in destabilising activities in some of the countries they operate in, including Libya, Syria, Ukraine (Donbas) and the Central African Republic. The group is also spreading its malign influence elsewhere, notably in the Sahel region. For these reasons the group constitutes a threat for the people in the countries were they are present, the wider region and for the European Union.

The aim of today’s decision is to curtail the subversive activities of the Wagner Group. It signals the EU’s strong determination to stand up for its interests and values in its neighbourhood and beyond, and to take tangible action against those threatening international peace and security, and breaching international law.

The restrictive measures imposed today were agreed under four different sanctions regimes: the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, and sanctions regimes relating to the situation in Libya and Syria, as well as for actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The listed individuals and entities will now be subject to an asset freeze in the EU. In addition, listed individuals will be subject to a travel ban to the EU. Moreover, persons and entities in the EU will be prohibited from making funds available, either directly or indirectly, to those listed.

The relevant legal acts, including the names of the persons and entities concerned, have been published in the Official Journal.

Link:

EU Notice

EU Statement on Syria-related human rights conviction in Germany

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Syria: Statement by the Spokesperson on Anwar Raslan’s conviction of crimes against humanity 

Brussels, 14/01/2022 – 13:08, UNIQUE ID: 220114_9Statements by the Spokesperson

Thursday’s verdict of the higher regional court of Koblenz, Germany, whereby a Syrian former colonel, Anwar Raslan, was found guilty of crimes against humanity in 2011 and 2012 in Syria constitutes a landmark decision.

This verdict is part of the first trial worldwide on state-sponsored torture in Syria and an important step towards the fight against impunity and to secure justice and accountability in Syria. 

The EU has supported and will continue to support efforts to gather evidence with a view to future legal action, including by the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry.

The EU reiterates its call to have the situation in Syria referred to the International Criminal Court.

Link:

EU Statement

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